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ABSTRACT 
 
The medical scheme industry in South Africa is competitive in relation to 
international standards. The medical scheme sector, as part of the healthcare 
industry, is negatively affected by the high rate of fraud perpetrated by 
providers, members and syndicates, which results in medical schemes funding 
fraudulent claims. The purpose of the study was to explore strategies to mitigate 
fraud in medical scheme claims. A qualitative research methodology was 
followed in this study, which adopted a case study approach. Empirical data 
was analysed through thematic analysis, with the aid of ATLAS.ti software. The 
study found that healthcare service providers mainly defraud medical schemes 
by submitting false claims. A holistic approach should be followed to mitigate 
fraud in medical scheme claims. This approach should encompass regularly 
identifying trends in fraudulent claims and implementing appropriate control 
strategies. Collaboration within the medical scheme industry and with other 
stakeholders would also help to elevate the fight against medical scheme fraud 
to a new level. Implementing the recommendations from the study will assist 
medical schemes to reduce the funds expended on fraudulent claims, thereby 
improving their financial viability and decreasing the rate of increase in medical 
scheme contributions for members. 
 
KEY TERMS: South Africa, healthcare, medical schemes, fraud, healthcare 
fraud, operational risk, qualitative, case study, thematic analysis, ATLAS.ti, risk 
mitigation. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore strategies to mitigate fraud in South 
African medical scheme claims. As posited in various literature sources, fraud 
risk in claims is high in South African medical schemes. Fraud in healthcare is 
regarded as a worldwide problem, and South Africa is not immune to this risk 
(Ogunbanjo & van Bogaert, 2014; Board of Healthcare Funders of Southern 
Africa, 2013). The perpetration of fraud against medical schemes was 
highlighted in the annual report of the Registrar in 1992 as one of the factors 
contributing to rising costs (Rama & McLeod, 2001). In support of this, 
Erasmus, Ranchod, Abraham, Carvounes and Dreyer (2016) identified fraud as 
one of the causes of escalating healthcare costs.  
 
Duckert (2011:196) describes the healthcare industry as “the only market place 
in the world where the primary consumer of the services desires the highest 
quality healthcare, does not know what to consume, when to consume it, how 
much to consume, why it is necessary to consume it, how much it should cost, 
and does not pay for it directly in most circumstances”. Morris (2009) also 
indicates that drug dealers are shifting their operations from drug dealing to 
healthcare fraud, as the risk of detection when committing healthcare fraud is 
minimal. Due to the nature of the healthcare industry, the inherent risk of fraud 
in these claims is regarded as very high, with an average of 6.9% of total 
healthcare expenditure estimated to be lost to fraud (Duckert, 2011; Gee & 
Button, 2014).  
 
Given the assertions made in various studies that fraud is a risk in healthcare 
claims, South African medical schemes, as part of the healthcare system, would 
also face a similar challenge. However, there is limited scholarly literature 
pertaining to this risk in the South African context. This motivated the 
researcher to conduct this study, which aimed at identifying fraud risk 
management strategies that could assist South African medical schemes to 
reduce the amount of funds expended on fraudulent claims.  
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A qualitative, exploratory methodology was used in this study, which adopted a 
case study design, where primary data was collected through interviews from 
a purposively selected sample, in order to derive rich insights from the study 
participants. Moreover, the data analysis methods were described in detail, 
after which the results of the study were presented. Lastly, the conclusion and 
recommendations of the study were discussed. 
 
This chapter starts with a background to the topic of the study, namely 
mitigating fraud in the healthcare sector. Thereafter, the problem statement is 
defined, and the research questions and objectives of the study are outlined. 
The methodology used in this study is then briefly discussed, and the chapter 
concludes by outlining the structure of the study.   
 
1.2 Background to the study 
 
The South African Police Service (SAPS) reported that South Africa is one of 
the countries experiencing an increase in crime levels (SAPS, 2016). Dabney 
(2013) defines crime as action or inaction by the perpetrator, in contradiction to 
the country’s laws, which warrants punishment. The types of crimes enlisted by 
Dabney (2013:12) include homicide or assault, sexual assault, robbery, 
common property crime, public order crime, and crime within complex 
organisation. Fraud is defined as “the unlawful, intentional distortion of the truth 
which is calculated to prejudice another” (SAPS, 2016:115).  
 
The SAPS classifies fraud under commercial crimes, which have seen an 
increase of 3.1% from 2015 to 2016. These crimes mainly encompass evading 
tax, defrauding banks and stealing trademarks (SAPS, 2016). Healthcare is 
vulnerable to fraud due to the manner in which it is structured, because unlike 
other industries, the cost of services or goods is sometimes paid by the third 
party in the form of government programmes or private health insurance 
(Benson & Simpson, 2015). In the healthcare context, fraud has been defined 
as “a type of white-collar crime involving the filing of dishonest healthcare 
claims in order to achieve a profit” (Ogunbanjo & van Bogaert, 2014:10). Fraud 
in healthcare occurs mainly in the form of the submission of false claims, 
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duplicate billing, billing for extra codes, up-coding, unbundling of codes, billing 
for excessive or unnecessary services, and kickbacks (Thornton, Mueller, 
Schoutsen & Van Hillegersberg, 2013). The World Health Organisation (WHO) 
regarded fraud as one of the critical reasons for healthcare inefficiencies (World 
Health Organisation, 2010). Gee and Button (2014) and Ogunbanjo and van 
Bogaert (2014) concurred with WHO and alluded to the fact that globally, 
healthcare fraud remains a significant problem. After realising that healthcare 
fraud is a profitable alternative, where the chances of detection are minimal, 
drug dealers have now shifted from dealing in narcotics to healthcare fraud 
(Morris, 2009; Benson & Simpson, 2015). 
 
Globally, fraud and abuse losses are estimated at 10% of the total healthcare 
expenditure (Nsiah-Boateng, Asenso-Boadi, Dsane-Selby, Andoh-Adjei, Otoo, 
Akweongo & Aikins, 2017). The loss of these funds intended for the provision 
of healthcare could be substantial, as healthcare is usually allocated a large 
budget. In turn, the huge amount of money spent on healthcare attracts 
fraudsters to the industry (Bauder, Khoshgoftaar & Seliya, 2017). The fraud 
losses in healthcare translate into billions of dollars in the United States 
(Engstrom, 2017).  
 
In the South African context, ethical transgressions sanctioned against 
healthcare professionals by the Health Professions Council of South Africa 
(HPCSA) were predominantly for fraud cases, which constituted 51.7% of all 
transgressions (Norjé & Hoffmann, 2016). Nevondwe and Odeku (2014) 
regarded fraud as a high risk in both the public and private sectors of South 
Africa. Ogunbanjo and van Bogaert (2014) suggested that fraud in South 
African medical schemes is escalating. Although healthcare fraud in South 
African private healthcare has not been measured, it is estimated that R13 
billion is lost to fraud (Bateman, 2015). Losses resulting from fraudulent claims 
will negatively affect medical schemes’ ability to meet the obligation to pay out 
beneficiaries’ claims for health services rendered. This will also result in low 
solvency levels, which will affect the financial viability of medical schemes, 
thereby resulting in them being unable to reach and maintain the regulatory 
reserve of members’ contributions.  
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The challenge here is for medical schemes to discern between legitimate and 
fraudulent claims, which is a mammoth task. Nsiah-Boateng et al. (2017) 
posited that an essential part of operating an efficient and viable healthcare 
financing system is the successful discovery of fraud, errors and abuse. The 
types of fraud experienced by the healthcare sector should therefore be 
identified, in order to manage this risk effectively (Thornton, Brinkhuis, Amrit & 
Aly, 2015). The next section discusses the research problem of this study. 
 
1.3 Problem statement 
 
Recent research conducted in the previous five years in the healthcare fraud 
domain indicates the various ways in which the healthcare sector is defrauded. 
Thornton et al. (2015) revealed that healthcare fraud occurs mostly in the form 
of claiming for services not rendered (false/ phantom claims), up-coding, 
unbundling of codes, rendering of unnecessary services, using unauthorised 
service providers, identity fraud, duplicate claims, and the sharing of healthcare 
benefits with members not belonging to the medical scheme. The findings of 
the study conducted by Debpuur, Dalaba, Chatio, Adjuik and Akweongo (2015) 
showed that members seeking unnecessary healthcare services abused the 
national health insurance scheme in Ghana. The sharing of medical scheme 
membership cards with non-members was also uncovered in the study carried 
out by Debpuur et al. (2015).  
 
Flynn (2016) found that the private health insurance industry experienced 
various types of fraud. In particular, this industry was defrauded through scams 
by identity thieves and service providers (Flynn, 2016). The service providers 
were providing cosmetic surgery, which is an excluded benefit, but claimed for 
a covered benefit (Flynn, 2016). Like Thornton et al. (2015), Debpuur et al. 
(2015) and Flynn (2016) found that service providers billed scheme members 
for services not provided, overcharged members for services, and over-
serviced members. Thornton et al. (2015) and Flynn (2016) reported that 
kickback schemes were a way to defraud the healthcare sector.  In the South 
African context, the nature of fraudulent activities found by Norjé and Hoffmann 
(2016) encompassed submission of false claims and irregular coding, resulting 
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in higher amounts being billed, which is a similar pattern reported by Thornton 
et al. (2015), Debpuur et al. (2015) and Flynn (2016). 
 
Most of the recent studies conducted in the area of management of fraud in 
healthcare mainly investigated the manner in which technology can assist in 
fraud detection (Wakoli, Orto & Mageto, 2014; Joudaki, Rashidian, Minaei-
Bidgoli, Mahmoodi, Geraili, Nasiri & Arab, 2015; Abdallah, Maarof & Zainal, 
2016; Van Capelleveen, Poel, Mueller, Thornton & Van Hillegersberg, 2016). A 
study by Wakoli et al. (2014) on the medical claims of insurance companies in 
Kenya found that the K-Means clustering model could be used to identify 
suspicious fraudulent claims. The study by Joudaki et al. (2015), which focused 
on physician claims in an Iranian private healthcare insurance company, found 
that data mining techniques such as cluster analysis could be utilised to identify 
suspected fraudulent claims and providers. Van Capelleveen et al. (2016) also 
found that unsupervised data mining techniques could be used to identifying 
outlier claims, and utilised Medicaid data focusing on dentists’ healthcare 
claims for one state in the United States.   
 
Healthcare fraud has been studied in various countries, as indicated in the 
preceding discussion. Although healthcare fraud is regarded as a major risk, 
there is limited available scholarly literature on the phenomenon in South 
African medical schemes. This study aimed to identify fraudulent activities 
committed against South African medical schemes in terms of claims. 
Moreover, this study explored strategies to mitigate fraud risk in medical 
scheme claims in the South African context. To this end, a matrix representing 
strategies to mitigate fraud in South African medical schemes is advanced in 
this study. 
 
The research questions and objectives that were derived from the problem 
under investigation in this study, namely fraud in medical scheme claims in 
South Africa, are outlined in the following section. 
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1.4 Research questions 
 
The primary research question addressed by this study was the following:  
How can South African medical schemes mitigate fraud in claims?  
 
The secondary research questions were as follows: 
 
 What types of fraudulent activities have been perpetrated against South 
African medical schemes? 
 What strategies could be implemented by South African medical schemes 
to manage fraud in claims?  
 
1.5 Objectives of the study 
 
The overall objective of the study was to identify strategies that South African 
medical schemes could implement in order to mitigate fraud in their claims.  
 
The secondary objectives of the study were to: 
 
 Identify the types of fraudulent activities perpetrated against South African 
medical schemes; 
 Explore strategies that could be implemented to manage fraud in South 
African medical scheme claims. 
 
1.6 Contributions of the study 
 
The study aimed to identify the manner in which South African medical 
schemes are defrauded. In addition, it explored strategies that could be utilised 
by the medical schemes to mitigate fraud in claims.   
 
The recommendations arising from the study can be implemented by medical 
schemes to mitigate fraud in claims, thereby reducing the amount of money 
spent on fraudulent medical claims. This will increase the reserves and improve 
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the financial viability of medical schemes. These savings will ultimately result in 
a better quality of healthcare through the enrichment of benefit offerings by 
medical schemes, and reduce the rate of increase for monthly contributions, 
thereby improving affordability for members.  
 
1.7 Methodology 
 
This study adopted an interpretivist philosophical stance, which purports that 
there is more than one reality (Creswell, 2014). The interpretivist philosophical 
position was deemed appropriate for the study, as the researcher was more 
concerned about gathering rich insights into subjective meanings, rather than 
generalisation of the findings. A cross-sectional qualitative study was 
conducted, using a single case study. A case study strategy enables the 
researcher to study the problem comprehensively in its natural setting (Yin, 
2012). The population for the study was all medical scheme administrators in 
South Africa. One medical scheme administrator company was purposively 
selected as a case study, since it administers a sizeable number of 
beneficiaries, who belong to both open and closed medical schemes. From this 
company, 15 participants were purposively selected. According to Rule and 
John (2011), purposive sampling is a technique that allows the researcher to 
select the most relevant participants, who will be able to provide high-quality 
data pertaining to the study. Therefore, selection criteria were based on their 
ability to provide rich insight into the fraudulent activities perpetrated against 
medical schemes, and the manner in which this risk could be mitigated.  
 
Utilising an interview schedule comprising open-ended questions, data was 
collected by the researcher through individual semi–structured interviews. 
Open-ended questions allowed the participants to answer the questions without 
being restricted to pre-formulated answers (Beins, 2013). Semi-structured 
interviews provide some guidance for the interview, whilst allowing the 
researcher the flexibility to clarify responses and ask additional questions 
(Myers, 2013). The interviews were scheduled with research participants at a 
convenient time, and were held at participants’ place of work for an hour. The 
interviews were recorded with an audio-recorder, and notes were also taken by 
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the interviewer. The interviews were then transcribed from audio to text. 
Thematic data analysis was done using ATLAS.ti qualitative data analysis 
software. Data was first coded and patterns that emerged from the data were 
then identified and grouped into themes to produce meaningful findings. Based 
on the findings of the study, conclusion and recommendations were made on 
how to mitigate fraud risk in South African medical schemes. 
 
1.8 Research ethics 
 
The study was conducted in an ethical manner. Informed consent was 
requested in writing from the company selected as a case study, as well as from 
the individual participants who were interviewed. The identities of the company 
and participants were kept confidential, and all participants were protected from 
harm. Furthermore, ethical clearance for the study was granted by the 
University of South Africa before conducting the research (see Appendix B for 
the ethical clearance certificate).  
 
1.9 Limitations and delimitations 
 
The healthcare financing system in South Africa encompasses the public 
sector, donor funds, and the private sector, which is further subdivided into 
medical schemes, pure health insurance and out-of-pocket payments (Ataguba 
& Akazili, 2010; Econex, 2013). In this study, the focus was limited to fraud in 
the medical scheme claims in South Africa. A study focusing on the healthcare 
sector as a whole may not yield similar results to this study. The qualitative 
research methodology used to conduct the study implies that the results cannot 
be generalised to all the medical schemes in South Africa, as a representative 
sample was not selected for data collection.  
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1.10 Structure of the study  
 
The study consisted of the following five chapters:  
 
 Chapter one introduced the study. The background to the problem was 
detailed. In addition, the problem statement, research questions, objectives 
of the study, method of investigation and structure of the study were 
discussed. 
 In chapter two, the theories that support the study were discussed, as well 
as the risk management concepts. Existing empirical literature relating to 
healthcare fraud was reviewed, and the medical scheme industry was briefly 
explained. The chapter concluded by discussing the challenges in mitigating 
healthcare fraud. 
 In chapter three, the research methodology used in the study was 
discussed, in particular the qualitative research methodology and case 
study strategy adopted in the study. The chapter also discussed the data 
collection and analysis procedures which were followed in the study. The 
manner in which the measures of trustworthiness were addressed were also 
described, as well as the ethical issues that were considered. 
 Chapter four presented the findings of the study, which were analytically 
interpreted and grouped into themes.  
 Chapter five reported on the conclusion of the study and made 
recommendations on strategies to mitigate fraud risk in medical schemes. 
Furthermore, limitations of the study and suggested areas for further 
research were discussed. 
 
The next chapter focuses on a review of the theories that support the study, 
and discusses risk management concepts. Furthermore, related literature is 
reviewed on the topic under study. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ON FRAUD 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter introduced the study. The purpose of this chapter is to 
review literature pertaining to fraud elements, based on the fraud triangle and 
diamond theories. Fraud risk management concepts are also discussed in this 
chapter, and literature is reviewed in order to understand the types of fraud in 
healthcare, as well as mitigating strategies in this regard. The healthcare 
financing system in South Africa, with a focus on medical schemes, is also 
outlined in the chapter.   
  
2.2 Definition of key terms 
 
In this section, the key terms used in this study are defined, namely operational 
risk, fraud, healthcare fraud, and a medical scheme in the South African 
context. 
 
2.2.1 Definition of operational risk 
 
Several definitions of operational risk have been advanced in the literature, as 
indicated below.  
 
Operational risk is defined as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal process, people, and systems or from external events” (Chapman, 
2013:268-269; Laycock, 2014:193). 
 
Operational risk is also defined as “the exposure of an organisation to potential 
losses, resulting from shortcomings and/or failures in the execution of its 
operations. These losses may be caused by internal failures or shortcomings 
of people, processes and systems, as well as the inability of people, processes 
and systems to cope with the adverse effects of external factors” (Young, 2014: 
21).  
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The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision classifies fraud as one of the 
operational risks, and further categorises fraud as either internal or external 
fraud (Girling, 2013). Internal fraud may emanate from the actions of people in 
the employ of the company (Girling, 2013). External fraud in the healthcare 
domain may arise from healthcare service providers and syndicates submitting 
false claims to healthcare insurers (Flynn, 2016). Risk control involves “the 
activities designed for the purpose of eliminating or reducing the factors that 
may negatively influence the strategic objectives and may cause a loss to the 
organisation” (Young, 2014:103). 
 
2.2.2 Definition of fraud 
 
Fraud can be defined as “the intentional deception that covers any crime for 
gain that causes the victim to endure a loss and causes the perpetrator to 
realise a gain” (Arshad, Razali & Bakar, 2015:115).  
 
Wekesa, Namusonge and Makokha (2016:375) state that “fraud is an 
intentional act of individuals among management, employees or third parties 
who produce errors in financial reporting in favour of their personal desires”. 
 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO, 2016: viii) defines fraud as “any intentional act or omission designed 
to deceive others, resulting in the victim suffering a loss and/or the perpetrator 
achieving gain”. 
 
From the aforementioned definitions, it is clear that fraud is an intentional act 
aimed at deceiving others (Arshad et al., 2015; Wekesa et al., 2016; COSO, 
2016: viii). The perpetrator of fraud profits, whilst the victim suffers or 
experiences a loss (Arshad et al., 2015; COSO, 2016).  
 
2.2.3 Definition of healthcare fraud 
 
In the healthcare context, Ogunbanjo and van Bogaert (2014:S10) define 
healthcare fraud as “a white-collar crime involving the filing of dishonest 
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healthcare claims in order to achieve a profit”. Another behaviour that is 
proximal to fraud is abuse. However, in the case of the latter, the intention to 
derive overpayment for healthcare services rendered cannot be verified 
(Rudman, Eberhardt, Pierce & Hart-Hester, 2009). Although there is a 
difference between abuse and fraud in healthcare, these behaviours could be 
committed concurrently (Joudaki et al., 2015). 
 
In this study, the researcher defines medical scheme fraud as any premeditated 
activity by an internal and/or external person; aimed at profiting by submitting 
false, irregular or inflated claims, which results in financial loss to the medical 
scheme.    
 
2.2.4 Definition of a medical scheme 
 
The Medical Scheme Act (1998) defines the business of a medical scheme as 
“the undertaking liability in return for a premium or contribution: 
 
 to make provision for the obtaining of any relevant health service, 
 to grant assistance in defraying expenditure incurred in connection with the 
rendering of any relevant health service, and 
 where applicable, to render a relevant health service, either by the medical 
scheme itself, or by any supplier or group of suppliers of a relevant health 
service or by any person, in association with or in terms of an agreement 
with a medical scheme” (Medical Schemes Act 131, 1998:3-4).  
 
2.3 Theories on fraud 
 
The theories examined in this study in order to understand the reasons for fraud 
were the Fraud Triangle Theory and its extended variant, namely the Fraud 
Diamond Theory. 
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2.3.1  Fraud Triangle Theory 
 
The Fraud Triangle Theory developed by Donald Cressey (1953) is a classical 
theory that has been extensively utilised theoretically and practically to 
understand and manage fraud (cited in Schuchter & Levi, 2016). Cressey 
conducted a study in 1950 to identify the elements that lead to people in 
positions of trust committing white-collar crime (Abdullahi & Mansor, 2015; 
Schuchter & Levi, 2016). In Cressey’s study, over 120 participants who had 
been imprisoned for white-collar crimes committed whilst in a position of trust 
in their previous employment were interviewed (Schuchter & Levi, 2016).  
 
Cressey found that three factors have to be present prior to someone 
committing a white-collar crime (Abdullahi & Mansor, 2015). Firstly, the violators 
of trust perceive that the problem cannot be shared with other people 
(Schuchter & Levi, 2016). This non-shareable problem is referred to as 
pressure, motivation or incentive in recent literature (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004; 
Abdullahi & Mansor, 2015; Schuchter & Levi, 2016). Secondly, Cressey 
indicated that the opportunity to commit fraud should be present (Abdullahi & 
Mansor, 2015). Thirdly, the person rationalises the behaviour in order to 
perpetrate fraud (Abdullahi & Mansor, 2015; Schuchter & Levi, 2016). 
 
The study culminated in the development of an explanatory framework for 
financial fraud, namely the Fraud Triangle Theory (Schuchter & Levi, 2016). 
This theory, which is depicted in Figure 2.1 below, comprises of three elements: 
pressure, opportunity and rationalisation.  
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Figure 2.1 The fraud triangle  
Source: Abdullahi and Mansor (2015:9) 
 
2.3.2  Fraud Diamond Theory 
 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) extended the Fraud Triangle Theory to include a 
fourth element, after realising that despite efforts to curb fraud, this risk was still 
escalating. Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) recommended that in order to 
effectively detect and prevent fraud, the capability of the perpetrator to commit 
fraud should be considered. This resulted in an improved theory, namely the 
Fraud Diamond Theory. Various authors have cited the theory as a valuable 
structure to manage fraud within organisations (Abdullahi & Mansor, 2015; 
Ruankaew, 2016). The other point raised by Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) was 
that even if the three factors of pressure, opportunity and rationalisation are 
present, if the potential perpetrator does not have the capability to commit a 
fraudulent act, this act will not occur. Figure 2.2 below depicts the fraud 
diamond. 
 
Pressure
RationalizationOpportunity
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      Figure 2.2 The fraud diamond  
Source: Wolfe and Hermanson (2004:38) 
 
The elements of fraud that emerged from the fraud triangle and fraud diamond 
theories are discussed in the next section. 
 
2.3.3  Elements of fraud 
 
2.3.3.1 Pressure/ motivation/ incentive  
 
The element of pressure exists because the person views the problem as non-
shareable, and this serves as a motivation for committing white-collar crime 
(Schuchter & Levi, 2016). In most cases, this problem is related to financial 
difficulties, though social and political pressures can encourage fraudulent 
behaviour as well (Abdullahi & Mansor, 2015). Thus, others will view the 
perpetrator as having a higher social status if he or she is financially successful 
(Schuchter & Levi, 2016). According to Imoniana and Murcia (2016), political 
pressure emanates from the need of people with political power to preserve 
their positions by awarding projects to members in their political parties in a 
fraudulent manner. Furthermore, the fraudster wants to be regarded as 
financially successful in his or her chosen career (Lokanan, 2015). 
Opportunity
Rationalisation
Capability
Incentive
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2.3.3.2 Rationalisation 
 
According to Abdullahi and Mansor (2015), rationalisation implies that a person 
tries to justify his or her immoral behaviour before committing fraud, in order to 
minimise their guilty conscience. Ruankaew (2016) posited that fraudsters 
convince themselves mentally that it is acceptable to engage in unethical 
behaviour. In terms of internal fraud, the perpetrator rationalises the fraudulent 
act by blaming the organisation (Soltani, 2014). 
 
2.3.3.3 Opportunity  
 
The prospect of committing fraud emanates from poor controls to manage fraud 
within the system, which convinces the fraudster that the chance of success is 
high and there is lower risk of being caught (Abdullahi & Mansor, 2015). An 
environment that is characterised by poor controls creates an opportunity for 
fraud to be successfully committed against an organisation. Morris (2009) 
posited that organised criminals are moving from drug dealing to healthcare 
fraud, as there are opportunities to commit fraud successfully without being 
caught. The element of opportunity could play a major role in mitigating fraud 
in healthcare, since the weaknesses in internal controls can be reduced to limit 
the frequency of fraud events in healthcare.  
 
2.3.3.4 Capability 
 
A person who is able to commit fraud has specific personality traits and abilities 
(Abdullahi & Mansor, 2015). Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) posited that these 
traits and abilities include the fact that the person occupies a position that allows 
fraud to be committed, and knows how to exploit the controls that have been 
put in place. In addition, this person is egotistical, self-confident, manages 
stress well and has the ability to force other people to commit fraud (Wolfe & 
Hermanson, 2004). The personality trait of being able to influence other people 
to commit fraud increases collusion amongst fraudsters. 
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Schuchter and Levi (2016) conducted a study in 2010 with nine Swiss and four 
Austrian white-collar fraudsters who either served time in prison or were never 
incarcerated for their crimes. Schuchter and Levi (2016) revealed that not all 
the fraud triangle elements have to exist concurrently in order to predict 
fraudulent behaviour. The most common and significant factor identified by the 
study participants was perceived pressure to commit fraud. Nevertheless, 
Schuchter and Levi (2016) suggested that all the fraud elements could be 
modified by organisations to reduce the probability of fraud occurring. 
 
The fraud elements that were discussed in the previous subsections have 
become the pillars for understanding the factors that influence fraudulent 
activities. The consideration and understanding of elements of fraud assist in 
the management of healthcare fraud. In such circumstances, the patient 
entrusts service providers, such as medical practitioners and nurses, with his 
or her health. The element of trust makes the patient and funders of healthcare 
vulnerable to fraud in cases where this trust has  been violated.  
 
The understanding of risk factors could assist healthcare organisations, 
including medical schemes, to introduce measures to reduce fraud losses. For 
instance, implementing visible controls minimises the opportunity for fraudulent 
activities. Furthermore, ongoing fraud awareness training and monitoring of 
new trends facilitate effective responses to fraud risk (Schuchter & Levi, 2016). 
The fraud triangle informs and guides the formulation of internal audit standards 
for fraud detection (Schuchter & Levi, 2016). 
 
The previous discussion concentrated on the elements that are precursors to 
fraudulent behaviour, based on the fraud triangle and fraud diamond theories. 
The following section examines the different types of fraud, with a focus on 
healthcare fraud.  
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2.4 Types of fraud 
 
Fraud reported in recent times includes Ponzi and pyramid schemes, securities 
fraud, corporate accounting financial scandals, healthcare fraud, automobile 
insurance fraud and art forgeries fraud (Gong, McAfee & Williams, 2016). The 
ensuing discussion focuses on types of healthcare fraud. 
 
2.4.1 False claims 
 
False claims, also referred to as phantom claims, are submitted to the 
healthcare funder for services that were not rendered (Thornton et al., 2015). 
This is the most common type of fraud committed against healthcare funders 
(Pande & Maas, 2013). Such claims are sometimes submitted to the provider, 
who is in collusion with the insured member, when there is an agreement 
between the service provider and member to defraud the healthcare funder 
(Abdallah et al., 2016). In other instances, service providers obtain the health 
insurance details of the member and submit false claims without the member’s 
knowledge (Flynn, 2016). With regard to the submission of false claims, 
collusion may also occur amongst service providers (Joudaki et al., 2015). 
Identity fraud could also occur without the member being privy to this, as in 
cases of syndicate scams, where the intention is to submit false claims to the 
healthcare insurer, utilising the member’s profile (Flynn, 2016).  
 
2.4.2 Over-servicing/unnecessary healthcare services 
 
This occurs when the healthcare provider renders a healthcare service that is 
over and above what is required (Abdallah et al., 2016). The service provided 
does not improve the clinical outcome of the patient and is questionable in 
comparison with the normal practice followed by the service provider’s peers 
(Flynn, 2016). Members put their trust in the healthcare provider and are unable 
to determine the type and level of service needed (Van den Heever, 2012). The 
false diagnosis of a medical condition is given to health insurers, in order to 
justify the over-prescription and tests conducted by the service provider 
(Rashidian, Joudaki & Vian, 2012). Pande and Maas (2013) reported the case 
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of a physician who performed unnecessary eye operations on psychiatric 
patients in the United States and blinded some of them. 
 
2.4.3 Sharing of health benefits with non-members 
 
Members of health insurance who give their membership cards to non-
members seeking healthcare services (Debpuur et al., 2015) commit this type 
of fraud. In contrast with syndicated fraud, the members willingly consent to an 
illegible person utilising their health insurance membership card. 
 
2.4.4 Claiming for excluded products/ services as a covered benefit 
 
The service provider claims for an excluded product, but misrepresents the 
information on the account, in order to indicate that a covered service or benefit 
was provided (Flynn, 2016). For instance, the author found that in Australia, 
prostitutes were providing sexual services, which is an excluded benefit, and 
misrepresenting the claim to the health insurer as massage therapy, which is a 
covered benefit.  
 
2.4.5 Coding irregularities 
 
According to Abdallah et al. (2016), coding irregularities could take the form of 
up-coding, code padding and unbundling of codes. Rashidian et al. (2012) 
defined up-coding as a practice whereby the provider bills the patient for a 
costlier service than that which was actually provided. For instance, up-coding 
fraud could occur when the healthcare provider submits a claim to the funder 
indicating that the duration of the consultation was 30 minutes, even though the 
patient was only seen for 10 minutes (Bauder et al., 2017). Code padding is the 
fraudulent billing for extra codes for services provided, whilst the unbundling of 
codes is when several individual codes are charged, in order to derive more 
monetary benefit than charging for a single inclusive code (Thornton et al., 
2013). 
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2.4.6 Waiving of members’ deductibles 
 
This occurs when service providers fraudulently waive co-payments, which are 
levied by health insurers to curb costs, at the point of service (Thornton et al., 
2015). This practice will increase the demand for these providers’ services, as 
the insured does not incur costs, as per agreement with the insurer. 
 
2.4.7 Illegible service providers 
 
In this regard, non-medical professionals provide healthcare services to 
members and claim from the healthcare insurance company (Pande & Maas, 
2013; Norjé & Hoffmann, 2016). The risk of unregistered entities providing 
healthcare services was highlighted in the South African public sector, where 
the outsourcing of healthcare for psychiatric patients resulted in 91 deaths 
(Office of the Health Ombud, 2017). 
  
2.4.8 Double billing 
 
Duplicate claims refers to instances where the service provider bills twice for 
the same service, in order to defraud the funder (Thornton et al., 2013; Abdallah 
et al., 2016). Nsiah-Boateng et al. (2017), in their study on the Ghanaian 
healthcare insurance industry, found that providers were fraudulently 
submitting duplicate claims.   
 
2.4.9 Kickbacks and self-referrals 
 
Providers sometimes refer patients to other service providers for unnecessary 
services, in order to increase the utilisation of services (Abdallah et al., 2016). 
The referring healthcare professional sometimes receives kickbacks 
(commission) or has financial interests in the company to which patients are 
referred for further treatment (Thornton et al., 2015).  
 
Healthcare fraud exists in the form of false claims, providing clinically 
unnecessary healthcare services, coding irregularities, double billing, waiving 
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members’ deductibles, kickbacks, self-referrals and claiming for excluded 
products or services. Furthermore, members of a healthcare insurance share 
their benefits with illegible members, thereby defrauding healthcare funders. 
Unqualified people also defraud healthcare insurers by providing healthcare 
services, even though they are not qualified healthcare professionals. Provision 
of unwarranted healthcare services could harm the member’s health (Pande & 
Maas, 2013). Moreover, fraudulent claims drain the financial resources 
intended to provide healthcare (Nsiah-Boateng et al.,2017). 
The following section discusses fraud risk management. 
 
2.5 Fraud risk management 
 
The Council for Medical Schemes (2012) positions risk management as a key 
area of medical scheme management. It states that “the scheme should provide 
full details on risk management tools currently in place, as well as those risk 
management tools to be implemented to improve the solvency levels of the 
scheme” (Council for Medical Schemes, 2012). The Basel Committee of 
Banking Supervision includes fraud as one of the operational risks (Girling, 
2013). Risk could either have an upside consequence, which is positive to the 
organisation, or a downside consequence, where the occurrence of the risk will 
affect the organisation negatively, such as fraud and financial loss (Young, 
2014).  
 
Risk appetite is defined as “the amount and type of risk that an organisation is 
willing to take to achieve its strategic objectives”. Therefore, an organisation will 
not have a risk appetite for fraud, as it is part of financial crimes (Blunden & 
Thirlwell, 2013:62). Fraud risk does not provide an advantage to organisations, 
and  therefore has to be managed. According to Blunden and Thirlwell (2013), 
risk management is driven by the operational risk management process. The 
risk management process is defined by Young (2014:47) as the “systemic 
application of risk policies, procedures and practices by means of identification, 
evaluation, control, financing and monitoring of operational risks”. 
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COSO advanced 17 principles in the revised 2013 internal control integrated 
framework (COSO, 2015). Principle eight of this framework puts particular 
emphasis on fraud risk assessment, indicating that “the organization should 
consider the potential for fraud in assessing risks to the achievement of 
objectives” (COSO, 2016: ix). The responsibilities for different levels of 
management pertaining to principle eight are also outlined. Firstly, COSO 
(2015) recommends that the board provides oversight of the systems and 
processes designed to detect and deter fraud, ensures that intermittent reports 
pertaining to fraud management are provided, and creates a culture that 
facilitates fraud control in the organisation. Reuvid (2013) emphasised the 
importance of the board having a clear understanding of the organisation’s 
overall exposure to risk. Secondly, the first line of defence, which refers to risk 
owners and managers, should carry out processes aimed at fraud deterrence 
and detection, and together with internal and external auditors, review the fraud 
risk exposure of the organisation (COSO, 2015).  
 
Thirdly, the risk, control and compliance functions, as the second line of 
defence, should ensure that fraud is included in risk and control assessments 
(COSO, 2015). The second line of defence and fraud investigative units may 
also be tasked with the development and monitoring of fraud risk policy in the 
organisation (COSO, 2015).  Lastly, internal audit, which is the third line of 
defence, should have adequate information regarding fraud, and keep this risk 
in mind when conducting audits (COSO, 2015). In order to guide organisations 
with regard to fraud risk management, COSO proposed a comprehensive risk 
management process, which is depicted in Figure 2.3 below. 
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Figure 2.3 Ongoing comprehensive fraud risk management process  
Source: COSO (2016: xiii) 
 
Like COSO (2016), Young (2015) proposed the same steps in the operational 
risk management process, which consists of risk identification, risk 
assessment, risk mitigation and control, and continuous monitoring and 
communication. Rashidian et al. (2012) suggested that healthcare fraud could 
be mitigated through the inclusion of preventative, detective and reactive 
measures in the strategies that form part of the COSO (2016) fraud risk 
management process. The steps in the COSO fraud risk management process 
are discussed in the following subsections.  
 
 
 
Establish a fraud risk 
management policy as 
part of organizational 
governance
Perform a 
comprehensive fraud 
risk assessments
Select, develop and 
delpoy preventative 
and detective fraud 
controls activities
Establish a fraud 
reporting process and 
coordinated approach 
to investigation and 
corrective action
Monitor the fraud risk 
management process, 
report results and 
improve the process
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2.5.1 Establishment of a fraud risk management policy as part of 
organisational governance 
 
A fraud risk management policy is first established and communicated to all 
employees of the company by the board of directors and senior management 
as part of governance (COSO, 2016). A fraud policy is one of the directive 
control measures aimed at providing guidance to the organisation (Blunden & 
Thirlwell, 2013).  
 
2.5.2 Performance of comprehensive fraud risk assessments 
 
In this step, the fraud risks facing the organisation are identified and assessed 
(COSO, 2016) by conducting workshops or interviews (Girling, 2013). The 
various elements that need to be considered in order to effectively identify and 
assess the risks include the reviewing of past risk and control assessments, 
internal loss history, and external events (Girling, 2013). Risk identification 
involves a group of experienced employees of the organisation establishing the 
‘risks and opportunities’, which are then recorded in the risk register by the 
facilitator (Chapman, 2013:159). After identifying these risks, they are assessed 
either qualitatively or quantitatively. Qualitative assessment of the risk involves 
differentiating it according to its frequency and potential impact (Young, 2014). 
Quantitative assessment of the risk refers to the utilisation of risk scenarios and 
modelling to quantify the risk (Blunden & Thirlwel, 2013).  
 
2.5.3 Selection, development and deployment of preventative and 
detective fraud control activities 
 
COSO (2016) recommends the implementation of preventative and detective 
controls after identifying and assessing risks. Preventative controls seek to stop 
the event from occurring, whilst detective control measures aim to identify the 
risk timeously as it happens, and then put preventative control measures in 
place (Young, 2014).  In the healthcare domain, known types of fraud such as 
duplicate claims can be detected and rejected for payment through data mining 
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techniques (Nsiah-Boateng et al., 2017). The problematic claim is automatically 
rejected, which prevents any financial loss to the funder.  
 
2.5.4 Establishment of a fraud process 
 
The organisation should put a fraud process in place, in order to provide a 
synchronised, seamless system to investigate fraud, and take corrective action 
once fraud has been confirmed (COSO, 2016). Corrective action should be 
taken after the risk event has occurred, and aim to remedy the effects of the 
risk (Blunden & Thirlwell, 2013). 
 
2.5.5 Monitoring of the fraud risk management process, reporting of 
the results, and improvement of the process 
 
The fraud risk management process has to be intermittently evaluated and 
reported on to determine any shortcomings, so that corrective actions can be 
taken timeously to improve the process (COSO, 2016). The strategies to 
mitigate healthcare fraud are discussed in the next section. 
 
2.6 Healthcare fraud and mitigating strategies 
 
The recent research conducted on healthcare fraud mitigation indicates that 
various strategies could assist in curbing fraud. These strategies that include 
member verification at the point of service, fraud awareness, stakeholder 
collaboration, data mining techniques and personnel with requisite skills will be 
discussed in the following subsections.  
 
2.6.1 Member verification at the point of service 
 
Member verification at the point of service can curb illegibility fraud and assist 
in mitigating the risk (Debpuur et al., 2015). The authors further recommended 
that improvement of the quality of the picture should be enhanced to assist the 
healthcare providers to confirm whether the member seeking care indeed 
qualify for the service. 
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2.6.2 Fraud awareness 
 
Flynn (2016) recommended that fraud awareness amongst healthcare 
insurance members could help to mitigate this risk. The manner in which 
healthcare schemes function, which is through cross-subsidization of costs 
should be explained to members (Debpuur et al., 2015). 
 
2.6.3 Stakeholder collaboration 
 
Collaboration between healthcare funders, both in the public and private 
sectors, should combine efforts to effectively and efficiently mitigate fraud-
related losses (Flynn, 2016).  
 
2.6.4 Data mining techniques 
 
Healthcare fraud can be detected utilising various data mining techniques and 
irregular patterns for further investigation (Wakoli et al., 2014; Van Capelleveen 
et al., 2016). Furthermore, fraud could be prevented by automatically rejecting 
known activities, for instance duplicate claims and illegible members’ claims 
through built-in automated system rules (Nsiah-Boateng et al., 2017).  
 
2.6.5 Personnel with requisite skills 
 
Personnel with required skills should be tasked with fraud management 
strategies (Flynn, 2016). The various requisite skilled mentioned by Flynn 
(2016) include amongst others statistical and clinical expertise. The next 
section discusses the South African medical scheme industry.  
 
2.7 Overview of the South African medical scheme industry 
 
Prior to describing how the South African healthcare system is structured, it is 
important to know what a healthcare financing system is. According to 
Olakunde (2012:4), a healthcare financing system “involves the means in which 
funds are generated, allocated, and utilized for healthcare”. A healthcare 
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financing system primarily gathers funds, which may originate from tax, out-of-
pocket or self-funding, donor financing and health insurance. It then assembles 
these funds and purchases healthcare services (Olakunde, 2012:4). Financing 
systems are varied and may exist side by side within a country. Thus, South 
Africa, similar to other developing countries, has both public and private health 
financing systems (Ataguba & Akazili, 2010). South Africa spent 8.9% as a 
proportion of its gross domestic product (GDP) in 2013 (Health Policy Project, 
2016). In 2015, the public healthcare sector contributed 48.3% of the total 
healthcare expenditure, 49.8% was from private sources, whilst donor funds 
only contributed 1.9% to the total healthcare costs (Health policy project, 2016). 
The medical schemes funded 83% of the total private healthcare expenses 
(Health policy project, 2016). 
 
In South Africa, health insurance products are offered by medical schemes, as 
well as long-term and short-term insurers (Childs & Erasmus, 2012). The pure 
private health insurance offered by long-term and short-term insurance 
companies is regulated by the Financial Services Board (FSB) and funds a 
significantly low percentage of healthcare in South Africa (Erasmus et al., 
2016). The products offered by these long-term and short-term companies are 
for profit, and include hospital cash plans, and dreaded disease and gap cover 
(Econex, 2013; Erasmus et al., 2016).  
 
Medical schemes pool members’ contributions and fund healthcare services 
and products at the point of service (Council for Medical Schemes, 2008; Van 
den Heever, 2012). The Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998 defines the business 
of a medical scheme as the business of undertaking liability in return for a 
premium or contribution, in order to make provision for obtaining any relevant 
health service (Medical Schemes Act 131, 1998). The medical scheme pays for 
costs related to the rendering of any relevant healthcare service and, where 
applicable, to the rendering of a relevant health service, either by the medical 
scheme or by any supplier or group of suppliers of a relevant health service, or 
by any person, in association with or according to an agreement with a medical 
scheme (Medical Schemes Act 131, 1998). 
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According to Erasmus et al. (2016), the medical schemes in South Africa are 
regulated by the Council for Medical Schemes (CMS). The role of the CMS is 
established by the Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998, which mainly provides 
regulatory supervision of private health financing by medical schemes. The 
CMS is responsible for a significantly large sector (Medical Schemes Act 131, 
1998), with the aim of, inter alia, safeguarding the welfare of medical schemes 
and members; gathering and distributing information regarding private 
healthcare in South Africa; overseeing the financial viability and solvency levels 
of medical schemes; and ensuring that medical scheme operations are aligned 
with the national health policy (Medical Schemes Act 131, 1998).  
 
Ramjee and McLeod (2010:180) listed the private health participants according 
to their functional roles in the healthcare system as follows: 
 
 Revenue Collection: Stakeholders involved in revenue collection include 
individual members of the public, organised labour, employers, brokers, and 
all taxpayers;  
 Pooling: Medical schemes and medical scheme members;  
 Purchasing: Purchasers consist of medical schemes, medical scheme 
administrators, managed-care organisations; and 
 Delivery: Healthcare service delivery stakeholders include private hospitals, 
pharmaceutical industry, medical practitioners, nurses, traditional healers, 
pharmacists and pharmacy owners. 
 
Medical schemes exist solely for the well-being of beneficiaries, with principal 
members being obliged to pay a monthly contribution and have the right to 
receive benefits in return, as per the registered rules of the scheme (CMS 
News, 2009/2010). Accordingly, medical scheme members are supposed to 
refrain from being dishonest, and must therefore desist from claiming for 
‘fraudulent claims’, failing which the member could be ‘suspended’ and 
‘terminated’ from the medical scheme (CMS News, 2009/2010:2). 
The medical scheme has the responsibility to pay for claims only in respect of 
registered members and dependants for whom contributions were received 
(CMS News, 2009/2010). Only two types of medical schemes exist in South 
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Africa, namely open (commercial) or closed (restricted) schemes (Van den 
Heever, 2012). An open medical scheme registered in South Africa is required 
to accept, as a member or dependant, any person who wishes to join that 
medical scheme. Furthermore, applicants must be accepted into the scheme 
regardless of factors such as their age or past and present medical history. In 
contrast, closed schemes only accept members employed by a specific entity 
or company (Erasmus et al., 2016).  According to the Council for Medical 
Schemes (2015/2016), there were 83 medical schemes in South Africa in 2015, 
comprising of 23 open schemes and 60 closed schemes. The law compels 
medical schemes to pay prescribed minimum benefit claims at full cost 
(Erasmus et al., 2016). The total amount paid by medical schemes for 
healthcare benefits amounted to R138.6 billion in 2015 (Council for Medical 
Schemes, 2015/2016). In the following section, empirical literature pertaining to 
healthcare fraud schemes and mitigation of this risk is reviewed.  
 
2.8 Empirical literature on healthcare fraud 
 
In this section, literature pertaining to healthcare fraud types and mitigation 
strategies is reviewed. The international perspective is considered first, 
followed by the South African context. 
 
2.8.1 International perspective on healthcare fraud 
 
2.8.1.1 Fraud in healthcare 
 
The unique features of the healthcare industry make the sector vulnerable to 
fraud. The study conducted by Pande and Maas (2013) reviewed records to 
analyse the types of healthcare fraud committed by convicted doctors in the 
United States. The results of their study revealed that the most common type 
of fraud was billing for false claims, followed by kickbacks, up-coding and billing 
for medically unnecessary services. Debpuur et al. (2015) explored the moral 
behaviours and practices of service providers and members in the national 
health insurance scheme. The participants, which included community 
30 
 
members, scheme employees and healthcare providers, were selected from 
one of the 22 districts in Ghana (Debpuur et al., 2015).  
 
Debpuur et al. (2015) collected their data through focus group interviews and 
individual in-depth interviews. Data was analysed thematically using QSR 
NVivo 8 software (Debpuur et al., 2015). The findings showed that the scheme 
was abused by members seeking unnecessary healthcare services and sharing 
their insurance membership cards with non-members (Debpuur et al., 2015). 
Service providers also billed scheme members for services not provided, 
overcharged members for services that were provided, and overprescribed 
medication (Debpuur et al., 2015). 
 
Similar to Debpuur et al. (2015), Flynn (2016) followed a qualitative 
methodology in a study of fraud in the private health insurance sector in 
Australia. The purpose of the study was to highlight distinct fraud acts 
perpetrated against the sector, the strained relationship between the private 
and public health sector, and the negative effect of the Privacy Act on fraud 
detection and related recoveries. Data was collected through interviews from 
experts in healthcare fraud detection and fraud managers from the largest 
private health insurance company in Australia (Flynn, 2016).   
 
The study by Flynn (2016) found that the private health insurance industry was 
exposed to various types of fraud. In this regard, the health insurance industry 
was defrauded through swindles by identity thieves and service providers 
(Flynn, 2016). The service providers were billing excessively for services; 
claiming for cosmetic surgery as a covered benefit; and claiming for services 
not rendered (Flynn, 2016). Thornton et al. (2015) reviewed the literature in 
order to classify healthcare fraud. Like Flynn (2016), the study found similar 
means through which this risk manifested itself. The additional types of fraud 
that were identified comprised of up-coding, unbundling of codes, using 
unauthorised service providers, kickback schemes, self-referrals, waiving of 
members’ deductibles, and duplicate claim submissions (Thornton et al., 2015).  
Pande and Maas (2013) found illegible service provider fraud, where individuals 
misrepresenting their qualifications provided healthcare services and claimed 
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from healthcare insurers. The next subsections reviews literature with regard to 
the mitigation of healthcare fraud. 
 
2.8.1.2 Mitigating healthcare fraud 
 
In the study conducted by Debpuur et al. (2015), the participants suggested 
that to mitigate abuse within the national health insurance scheme in Ghana, 
the premiums should be reduced to increase affordability. In addition, the 
quality of the picture on the card should be enhanced and health providers 
should verify members by closely scrutinising the picture on the card at the point 
of service. Furthermore, limits should be applied to benefits, in order to curb the 
abuse of the scheme (Debpuur et al., 2015). Providers and members should 
also be educated on how the national health insurance scheme functions 
through cross-subsidization of healthcare costs, and the implications of the 
failure of the scheme (Debpuur et al., 2015). Flynn (2016) suggested that skilled 
personnel in clinical and statistical analysis should be tasked to manage fraud. 
Collaborative efforts between public and private health insurance industries 
also heighten the effectiveness of fraud management strategies (Flynn, 2016). 
Fraud awareness amongst members, as well as the enhancement of fraud 
detection and recovery procedures, can be implemented in the private health 
insurance sector (Flynn, 2016).  
 
In the healthcare sector, there has been a change from the use of manual paper 
records to an electronic system (Abdallah et al., 2016). The shift to electronic 
records has also enabled the sector to process claims speedily and efficiently 
(Abdallah et al., 2016). However, the rapid payment of claims increases the risk 
of perpetrators remaining undetected, and consequently funding fraudulent 
claims. Nonetheless, the advent of electronic claims has created an opportunity 
for system application and data mining, which could support healthcare fraud 
management activities (Van Capelleveen et al., 2016). The following section 
discusses how data mining technique could be utilised in mitigating fraud in 
healthcare claims. 
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a) Data mining in healthcare fraud mitigation 
 
Data mining refers to the application of statistics, mathematics, artificial 
intelligence and machine learning to an enormous amount of data, in order to 
derive patterns and meanings (Abdallah et al., 2016). The main data mining 
types utilised in healthcare fraud detection are supervised and unsupervised 
techniques (Joudaki et al., 2015). According to Abdallah et al. (2016), 
supervised data mining involves the use of previously known and determined 
data that has been marked as fraudulent in nature, whilst the unsupervised 
approach detects fraud in data that is not categorised as fraud. 
 
Therefore, numerous studies have been conducted on the mitigation of 
healthcare fraud through the support of systems. The studies related to the 
application of systems in the fraud management of healthcare claims are 
reviewed in the subsequent sections. Furlan and Bajec (2008) investigated the 
way in which a fraud management system could be used to support all activities 
targeting fraud, as previous studies have only focused on detection. The unit of 
analysis chosen by Furlan and Bajec (2008) was Slovenia. These authors 
collected empirical data through semi-structured interviews with law experts 
who were conversant with fraud, service providers from various disciplines of 
medicine, and 15 fraud investigators from Slovenia’s public compulsory 
insurance and insurance companies (Furlan & Bajec, 2008).  
 
In addition, Furlan and Bajec (2008) followed a case study approach and 
developed a fraud management system for one of Slovenia’s voluntary health 
insurers. The objective of the study was to understand the practical challenges 
of implementing a comprehensive management system that supports all fraud-
mitigating activities. The results supported the proposition of applying the fraud 
management system, not only for healthcare fraud detection, but also for 
supporting other activities, namely deterrence, prevention, investigation, 
sanction and redress, and monitoring.  
 
Unlike Furlan and Bajec (2008), a survey conducted by Wakoli et al. (2014) in 
Kenya only focused on the use of system support to detect fraud. Medical 
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claims data from a randomly selected representative sample of 15 insurance 
companies was utilised (Wakoli et al.,2014). The medical claims were clustered 
and the average amount claimed per cluster was calculated using the Java 
programming language and mySQL database (Wakoli et al., 2014). Thereafter, 
the outlying claims from the norm were identified for further investigation. The 
study concluded that the K-Means clustering model would be effective in 
detecting suspicious fraudulent healthcare claims for further investigation 
(Wakoli et al., 2014). 
 
Nsiah-Boateng et al.’s (2017) study on the Ghanaian national health insurance 
scheme demonstrated that built-in rules for the electronic claims system were 
able to decrease the cost of claims at a higher rate when compared to the 
manual review of claims. The system rejected the payment of duplicate claims 
and illegible members’ claims (Nsiah-Boateng et al., 2017). 
 
The study conducted by Joudaki et al. (2015) aimed to show how data mining 
could be used to identify healthcare fraud and the abuse of claims, as well as 
the perpetrators of this crime. Joudaki et al. (2015) selected one health 
insurance company based in Iran and applied data mining techniques to 
physicians’ out-patient medication claims operating within individual private 
practices. The study found that data mining could assist in fraud detection in 
healthcare (Joudaki et al., 2015). The conclusion was that 2.5% of the 
physicians were involved in fraud in relation to  prescriptions for their insured 
members.  
 
Van Capelleveen et al. (2016) conducted another discipline-oriented study on 
the Medicaid program in the United States, with a specific focus on paid dental 
claims. The authors found that the use of unsupervised data mining techniques 
was effective in identifying outliers in these claims (Van Capelleveen et al., 
2016). In order to validate the results, they further discussed the results through 
semi-structured interviews with two healthcare fraud experts. Van Capelleveen 
et al. (2016) found that 71% of the claims that had been identified as outliers 
by the system were confirmed by experts as being suspicious for fraud, and 
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required further investigation. The following section discusses healthcare fraud 
in the South African context. 
 
2.8.2 South African perspective on healthcare fraud 
 
Norjé and Hoffmann (2016) followed a mixed methods approach to analyse the 
ethical transgressions of registered healthcare professionals in South Africa 
from 2007 to 2013. Historical records of healthcare professionals sanctioned by 
the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) were studied, and the 
findings showed that fraudulent cases dominated all the transgressions at 
51.7% (Norjé & Hoffmann, 2016).    
 
Most of the ethical transgression cases occurred amongst medical and dental 
practitioners, followed by Optometry Dispensing Optician Boards, of which 85% 
of all cases were found to be fraudulent in nature (Norjé & Hoffmann, 2016). A 
similar study conducted by Norjé and Hoffmann (2015a) focused specifically on 
physiotherapists, and found that fraud cases constituted 70.3% of all the ethical 
transgressions. Norjé and Hoffmann (2015b), in their other study, revealed that 
20% of all transgressions amongst psychologists were fraudulent in nature. 
 
In the South African context, the nature of fraudulent activities found by Norjé 
and Hoffmann (2014, 2015a, 2016) was mostly related to the billing for services 
not rendered, which is a similar pattern to that reported by Pande and Maas 
(2013), Debpuur et al. (2015) and Flynn (2016).  Service providers also 
submitted fraudulent claims to medical schemes (Norjé & Hoffmann, 2014, 
2015a, 2015b, 2016).  It was further revealed that dentists colluded with 
unregistered persons by billing for fraudulent medical scheme claims (Norjé & 
Hoffmann, 2014). Compiling a false medical report, billing for services of an 
outsourced unregistered laboratory, and misrepresentation of qualifications 
were amongst the most common types of fraud committed by healthcare 
professionals sanctioned by HPCSA (Norjé & Hoffmann, 2016). The following 
section discusses the literature reviewed in this study.  
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2.8.3 Discussion of reviewed literature on healthcare fraud 
 
Some of the studies conducted in the field of healthcare do not focus specifically 
on fraud, which was the phenomenon under investigation in this study in 
relation to South African medical schemes. Debpuur et al. (2015) sought to 
investigate the moral hazards in the Ghananian national health insurance 
scheme. Also, Nsiah-Boateng, et al; (2017) study was conducted in Ghana. In 
the South African context, Norjé and Hoffmann (2015a, 2015b, 2016) examined 
the case content of all ethical transgressions sanctioned by HPCSA which were 
not particularly focused on fraud in medical scheme claims.  
 
Although, recent studies have been conducted in the healthcare sector 
pertaining to fraud, these studies mainly concentrated on technological support 
in the mitigation of healthcare fraud, except for the study conducted by Flynn 
(2016). However, the focus of the authors was on fraud detection in healthcare 
claims (Wakoli et al., 2014; Abdallah et al., 2016; Joudaki et al., 2015; Van 
Capelleveen et al., 2016). Furlan and Bajec (2008) recommended that the fraud 
management system must not only detect fraud, but should support all activities 
in the management of this risk.  
 
The researcher agrees with Furlan and Bajec (2008), as the system could play 
a major role in healthcare fraud prevention, by automatically rejecting known 
fraudulent activities, thereby reducing this risk as well. This would enable 
resources to be allocated to the investigation of fraud cases and recoveries. 
Ongoing systems monitoring for known and unknown suspicious fraudulent 
claims is also essential in mitigating healthcare fraud. 
 
In this study, a comprehensive approach to mitigating fraud in medical schemes 
was explored from the perspective of a South African medical scheme 
administrator, based on the view that fraud in the healthcare sector in South 
Africa was on the increase (Ogunbanjo & Van Bogaert, 2014). Secondly, the 
majority of ethical transgressions by healthcare providers sanctioned by 
HPCSA were fraudulent in nature (Norjé & Hoffmann, 2016). The findings by 
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Norjé and Hoffmann (2016) demonstrated that fraudulent cases dominated all 
the transgressions at 51.7%.  
 
Flynn (2016) studied the same phenomenon as this study, but the unit of 
analysis was Australia’s health insurance sector. The results of Flynn’s (2016) 
study cannot be fully applied to South African medical schemes, due to the 
differences in healthcare financing systems between Australia and South 
Africa. In Australia, the publicly funded healthcare financing system is 
complemented by the healthcare insurance industry (Flynn, 2016). For 
example, hospitalisation-related costs are split, with 75% coming  from public 
funds, and the remaining  25% being  covered by health insurance (Flynn, 
2016). However, in South African medical schemes, membership is voluntary 
(Macha, Harris, Garshong, Ataguba, Akazili, Kuwawenaruwa & Borghi, 2012). 
Nonetheless, South African medical schemes are by law supposed to cover 
prescribed minimum benefits (Macha et al., 2012).  The research methodology 
selected for this study was similar to that employed by Flynn (2016). In this 
regard, the qualitative approach was adopted and data was gathered from the 
personnel who are responsible for mitigating fraud in their daily work activities 
at one of the medical scheme administrators. 
 
There is limited available scholarly literature regarding the mitigation of fraud in 
medical schemes in the South African context, hence the researcher opted to 
conduct this study. This study aimed to gain insight from a medical scheme 
administrator’s perspective into healthcare fraud in medical scheme claims in 
South Africa. Moreover, the strategies to mitigate payment of fraudulent 
medical scheme claims were also investigated. The results and 
recommendations will add to the body of existing scholarly literature. 
Furthermore, medical scheme administrators in South Africa could apply the 
recommendations from this study to mitigate fraud in claims. The funds saved 
from the fraudulent claims could enrich the benefit offering, reduce the rate of 
increment of members’ monthly contributions, increase affordability for non-
members, and safeguard the financial sustainability of medical schemes. The 
following section addresses the challenges experienced in mitigating fraud in 
healthcare. 
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2.9 Challenges in healthcare fraud mitigation 
 
Fraud trends evolve over time (Gong et al., 2016), which poses a significant 
challenge in mitigating this risk. The huge amounts of money that circulate in 
the healthcare sector attract fraudsters to the industry (Rashidian et al., 2012).  
Drug dealers were reported to be moving into the healthcare industry, as the 
chance of being prosecuted for this type of crime is low (Morris, 2009).  The 
study by Flynn (2016) found that the fight against fraud in the industry was 
impeded by health insurers’ low level of investment in technology and human 
resources to manage this risk.  
 
Van den Heever (2012) posited that on the demand side, the factors 
contributing  to failure include the fact that there is disproportionate information 
between the insurer and the insured. In addition, the insurer does not know the 
health status of the insurance applicant. The nature of the healthcare sector 
makes it impossible to predetermine the cost, as every patient’s medical 
condition is unique, and the client demands a high quality service (Duckert, 
2011). Therefore, according to Van den Heever (2012), the recipients of 
healthcare services are unable to evaluate whether the service is required, 
discern the kind of service needed, and asses the quality of the service 
rendered, due to the way in which the industry is designed. This creates an 
opportunity for fraud to fester in healthcare claims, as in most instances the 
claim is paid by a third party, for instance, the health insurer (Benson & 
Simpson, 2015). 
 
The lack of collaboration between public-funded insurance and private health 
insurers also frustrates the collective effort to mitigate fraud in the healthcare 
sector (Flynn, 2016). The large amount of healthcare data and the pressure to 
process the claims quickly presents a challenge in detecting fraud (Abdallah et 
al., 2016; Flynn, 2016). Some laws, such as the Private Act in Australia, were 
viewed as an obstacle because this legislature prohibits the sharing of 
information amongst the entities, thereby eliminating the opportunity to identify 
fraud at an industry level (Flynn, 2016).  
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2.10 Conclusion 
 
The chapter reflected on the fraud triangle and fraud diamond theories, which 
seek to explain the elements that exist before a fraudulent act is committed. 
Fraud risk management concepts were also discussed in detail. This was 
followed by a discussion of the South African medical scheme industry. 
Literature was also reviewed in order to understand fraud in the healthcare 
sector. Lastly, strategies employed to mitigate fraud were explored.  
 
The next chapter discusses the research methodology used to conduct this 
study.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, the literature review was presented. This chapter 
details the research design for this study. The research approach, methodology 
and strategy adopted to achieve the objectives of the study are also explained. 
The chapter further outlines the population for the study and sampling method 
used. In addition, the type of data and the data collection techniques used in 
this study are described. This is followed by a discussion of the data analysis 
procedures employed. Finally, the manner in which ethical issues were 
considered in this study is discussed. The following section describes the 
research design.  
 
3.2 The research design 
 
Research design refers to the methods that have been utilised to collect data 
that will decisively answer an empirical research question (Weathington, 
Cunningham & Pittenger, 2012). Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) defined 
a research design as the general plan of how the research question of the study 
will be answered. According to Myers (2013), the main purpose of a research 
design is to provide a roadmap of the whole research project, and should 
therefore include the philosophical assumptions, research methods, data 
collection methods, data analysis methods, and the writing of the report. 
Saunders et al. (2012) explained  that a research design contains clear 
objectives that have been derived from research questions, specifies sources 
from which the data was collected and analysed, as well as ethical issues that 
were encountered.  
 
According to Saunders and Tosey (2012/2013), the selection of the technique 
or techniques utilised to obtain data, as well as procedures to analyse data, 
represents only the ﬁnal decision about the overall research design. Figure 3.1 
below, metaphored the research ‘onion’ by Saunders and Tosey (2012/2013), 
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illustrates the various elements of a research design that need to be considered 
before data collection and analysis techniques can be selected. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 The research ‘onion’  
Source: Saunders and Tosey (2012/2013:59) 
 
The research ‘onion’ demonstrates, in a chronological order, how a 
philosophical position, methodology and research strategy should be selected, 
as well as the time horizon for the study. All these layers pave the way for and 
inform the data collection and analysis techniques that are ultimately chosen, 
which forms the inner core of the research ‘onion’. The details are discussed in 
the following sections. 
 
3.2.1 Philosophical positions 
 
Peeling the first layer of the research ‘onion’, the philosophical positions or 
worldviews that may be adopted for the study are broadly classified into 
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positivism, realism, interpretivism and pragmatism (Saunders & Tosey, 
2012/2013). The positivist adopts what is often referred to as a scientiﬁc 
method, in order to propose and test theories with data which is highly 
structured and usually measurable. Furthermore, the research is not inﬂuenced 
by the researcher’s values (De Vos, Strydom, Fouché & Delport, 2011). A 
revised positivist worldview that has emerged recently is called post-positivism, 
which suggests that there is no single reality when investigating human 
behaviour, and that multiple approaches should be utilised to conduct the 
research (Creswell, 2014).  
 
Similar to positivism, realism is a philosophical position associated with 
scientiﬁc enquiry and assumes that reality exists independent of the 
researcher’s influence (Saunders & Tosey, 2012/2013).  Data collection 
techniques and analysis procedures employed by a realist philosopher may be 
either quantitative or qualitative (or both) (Saunders & Tosey, 2012/2013). 
Philosophy of interpretivism is where the researcher aims to collect rich insights 
based on the experiences of study participants, instead of generalising the 
findings to the entire population (Saunders & Tosey, 2012/2013). Unlike the 
positivist, the interpretivist researcher considers research to be relevant and 
worthwhile to the phenomenon under study for the particular period during 
which the investigation is being conducted (Saunders & Tosey, 2012/2013). 
The researcher subjectively interprets the data, which is most often in the text 
format, in order to derive meaning (De Vos et al., 2011).    
 
With regard to the philosophical position of pragmatism, the importance of 
research is based on the ﬁndings that provide applicable solutions to the 
problem being investigated (Creswell, 2013). Pragmatic researchers employ 
mixed methods and are at liberty to use both quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies in their studies (Creswell, 2014). This study adopted an 
interpretivism position, which was deemed to be most appropriate because the 
study aims to gain rich insight and knowledge on how to mitigate fraud in 
medical schemes in the South African context. The next  section discusses the 
research approach. 
 
42 
 
3.2.2 Research approach 
 
Saunders et al. (2012) added another layer after the philosophical position, 
namely the research approach, which may be either deductive, inductive or 
abductive, as presented in Table 3.1 below. The research approach, which is 
also known as the logic of research, refers to “whether the research logic moves 
from the general to the specific or vice versa” (Collis & Hussey, 2014:3). 
According to Saunders et al. (2012), knowledge of the research approaches 
assists the researcher to make an informed decision about the research design 
and research strategies that will be best suited to the study in question. In 
addition, these approaches enable the researcher to adapt the research design 
to cater for constraints. 
 
 Table 3.1: Research approaches: Deduction, induction and abduction 
 Deduction Induction Abduction 
Logic In deductive 
inference, when the 
premises are true, 
the conclusion must 
also be true 
In an inductive 
inference, known 
premises are used to 
generate untested 
conclusion 
In an abductive 
inference, known 
premises are used to 
generate testable 
conclusions 
Generalisability Generalising from 
the general to the 
specific 
Generalising from 
the specific to the 
general 
Generalising from 
the interactions 
between the specific 
and the general 
Use of data Data collection is 
used to evaluate 
propositions or 
hypotheses related 
to an existing theory 
Data collection is 
used to explore a 
phenomenon, 
identify themes and 
patterns and create a 
conceptual 
framework 
Data collection is 
used to explore a 
phenomenon, 
identify themes and 
patterns, locate 
these in a conceptual 
framework and test 
this through 
subsequent data 
collection and so 
forth 
Theory Theory falsification or 
verification 
Theory generation 
and building 
Theory generation or 
modification; 
incorporating existing 
theory where 
appropriate, to build 
new theory or modify 
existing theory 
Source: Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) 
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After consideration of the research approaches, the inductive approach was 
selected based on the nature of this study, which aimed to explore and identify 
themes and patterns in the data that have been gathered on how fraud can be 
mitigated in South African medical schemes. The following section details the 
methodology selected for the study. 
 
3.2.3   Methodological choice  
 
The methods that can be chosen for conducting research are broadly 
categorised into quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods (Kumar, 2014). 
These methods are further explained in the following subsections. 
 
3.2.3.1  Quantitative research method  
 
Quantitave research, which is usually associated with the deductive approach, 
aims to examine the relationship between variables, often incorporates controls 
to ensure validity of data, and mostly uses probability sampling techniques to 
ensure generalisability of the research findings (Saunders et al., 2012). The 
purpose of quantitative research is to present  a statement of objective facts, 
predictions, generalisations, and the establishment of universal law-like 
findings (Rule & John, 2011). Research strategies generally employed in a 
quantitative research design include experimental and survey research 
conducted using techniques that encompass questionnaires, structured 
interviews, or structured observations (Saunders et al., 2012). According to 
Duignan (2014), the data associated with quantitative research methods 
provides a platform for the usage of statistical techniques.  
 
3.2.3.2  Qualitative research method 
 
In contrast to quantitative research, qualitative research is based on the 
opinions and experiences of study participants, which cannot be deemed to 
lack subjectivity (Rule & John, 2011). An interpretive philosophy is usually 
adopted in qualitative research. However, similar to a quantitative research 
design, realists and pragmatists may also use this research method (Saunders 
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et al., 2012). Qualitative research is generally inductive, and the researcher 
studies participants’ meanings (Saunders et al., 2012). According to Denzin and 
Lincoln (2013), the aim of a qualitative inquiry is to derive a more 
comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under study. In qualitative 
research, non-probability sampling techniques are employed (Saunders et al., 
2012). 
 
The researcher plays a major role in data collection and interpretation in 
qualitative studies (Corbin & Strauss, 2015). The primary materials that are 
utilised in the qualitative inquiry are varied and encompass the case study, 
personal experience, introspection, life story, interviews, artifacts, cultural texts, 
productions, and observational, historical, interactional and visual texts (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2013).  
 
3.2.3.3  Mixed methods  
 
According to Kumar (2014), mixed methods research is conducted through the 
utilisation of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies in one study, in 
order to circumvent the limitations of each method. Basic mixed methods 
identified by Creswell (2014) include convergent parallel, explanatory 
sequential and exploratory sequential mixed methods. These three mixed 
methods are described in the ensuing paragraph. 
 
In the convergent parallel mixed method, both quantitative and qualitative data 
are collected at the same time, in order to thoroughly understand the problem 
under study (Creswell, 2014). The explanatory sequential mixed method first 
employs quantitative methods, followed by qualitative methods, in order to 
explain the findings (De Vos et al., 2011). In contrast, Creswell (2014) stated 
that exploratory sequential mixed methods commence with exploratory 
qualitative methods, and then use quantitative methodologies. This type of 
mixed method is most beneficial if the phenomenon under study has not been 
thoroughly studied previously, as the results from the first stage of qualitative 
research could form the basis of the constructs to be tested in the quantitative 
stage (De Vos et al., 2011).  
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For this study, a qualitative research method was considered to be most 
appropriate for achieving the aim of the study. This is  due to the nature of the 
research objectives, which sought to gain insight and knowledge on the type of 
fraudulent activities committed against medical schemes in South Africa, and 
how this type of fraud could be mitigated. Available literature pertaining to the 
topic being studied in the South African context was also found to be limited. 
The following section discusses the research strategy for this study. 
 
3.2.4    Research strategy 
 
Saunders et al. (2012) defined a research strategy as a plan on how a 
researcher will go about answering the research question at hand, and is 
regarded as the methodological link between the philosophy and subsequent 
choice of methods to collect and analyse data. A number of research strategies 
identified by Saunders et al. (2012) and Sekaran and Bougie (2013) include 
experiment, survey, observation, case studies, grounded theory, archival 
research, ethnography, narrative inquiry, action research and mixed methods. 
A case study strategy was selected for this study. 
 
3.2.4.1  Case study research strategy 
 
Dul and Hak (2008) defined case study research as a study in which one case 
or a small number of cases in their real-life context are selected, and scores 
obtained from these cases are analysed in a qualitative manner. According to 
Yin (2012), all case study research starts from the same compelling point, which 
is the aspiration to derive an up-close or in-depth understanding of a single or 
small number of cases in their real-life context. The rationale for conducting a 
case study is to obtain a complete picture of the entire situation, which requires 
examining the real-life example, thereby enabling the researcher to identify 
interactions among all the variables in their natural setting (Hair Jr, Celsi, 
Money, Samouel & Page, 2011). The closeness aims to produce an invaluable 
and deep understanding, resulting in new discoveries about real-world 
behaviour and its meaning (Yin, 2012). Therefore, the researcher collects 
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various qualitative data from observations, documents, interviews and audio-
visual materials in case studies (Creswell, 2013:98). 
 
According to Yin (2012), three main situations create relevant opportunities for 
utilising the case study as a research method. Firstly, it is determined by the 
kind of research question that the study aims to address, which can be of a 
descriptive or exploratory nature (Yin, 2012).  Secondly, the case study strategy 
may be relevant in instances where the study method favours the collection of 
data in a natural setting, compared to relying on derived data (Yin, 2012). 
Thirdly, the case study method is utilised in conducting evaluations. 
 
Rule and John (2011) categorised case studies according to their purposes, 
and indicated that case studies may be exploratory, descriptive, historical or 
explanatory. Exploratory case studies aim to investigate a situation or 
phenomenon that might not have been previously investigated, and which have 
no existing theories (Rule & John, 2011). On the other hand, Rule and John 
(2011) explained that descriptive case studies answer what and how questions, 
where the purpose is to develop a rich, thick description of a phenomenon, and 
may use both qualitative and quantitative information. Rule and John (2011) 
further explain that historical case studies aims to provide perspective of 
phenomenon as it develops and changes over time by looking back from the 
present position and identify themes or patterns from the specific history of the 
case; whilst explanatory case studies aim at developing causal explanations 
and seek to explain why and how events occurred or situations exist. 
 
Three types of case studies identified by Creswell (2013:99), depending on the 
aim of the study, are a single instrumental case study, an intrinsic case study 
and a collective or multiple case study.  In a single instrumental case study, the 
researcher selects one case, with the aim of focusing on the issue at hand 
(Creswell, 2013:99). An intrinsic case study selects the case for the research 
based on the unusual, unique attributes of the case (Creswell, 2013:295). In a 
collective case study, an issue is investigated in relation to multiple cases 
(Creswell, 2013:99).  
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A single instrumental case study, which is exploratory in nature, was chosen 
for the collection of data in this study. The aim was to gain an in-depth insight 
into the fraudulent activities perpetrated against medical schemes and how this 
risk could be managed, by gathering data from one medical scheme 
administrator selected as a case, instead of replicating a number of cases or 
generalising the findings. The single case study ensured that the study was 
more manageable (Rule & John, 2011). Collecting data from the study 
participants in their working environment enhanced the gathering of rich 
insights pertaining to fraud in the medical scheme industry (Cameron & Price, 
2009). The medical scheme administrator was selected for the case study on 
the basis that it administers both open and closed medical schemes, which 
afforded the researcher an opportunity to gain a comprehensive picture of  the  
fraud activities in the industry, and how these activities could be managed. 
Furthermore, the geographical location of the premises of the selected case 
was convenient for the researcher to conduct the study. 
 
3.2.4.2  Description of the selected case  
 
As mentioned in section 3.2.4.1, a case study strategy was chosen for the study 
to collect primary data, in order to achieve the  research objectived. This data 
included the types of fraudulent activities committed against medical schemes 
and how the medical schemes in South Africa could manage fraud in claims. In 
2014, there were 22 registered medical scheme administrators in South Africa, 
and their number decreased to 17 in 2015 (Council for Medical Schemes, 
2014//2015; 2015/2016). One of these medical scheme administrators was 
chosen as a case study. The selected case is a company with its head office in 
South Africa, Gauteng province, and it is one of the top three medical scheme 
administrators in terms of market share. This is based on the number of 
beneficiaries administered as per the Council for Medical Schemes 
(2014/2015) annual report. The medical scheme administrators’ market share 
in 2015 is shown in Table 3.2 below. 
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Table 3.2: Medical scheme administrators’ market share 
Larget market share- 
All schemes 
2010 
% 
2011 
% 
2012 
% 
2013 
% 
2014 
% 
2015 
% 
% change: 
2010-2015 
Discovery Health (Pty) 
Ltd 
28.9 30.1 25.7 26.3 27.2 28.3 -2.1 
 
Medscheme Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd 
14.6 12.2 26.7 27.4 27.2 26.7 82.9 
Metropolitan Health 
Corporate (Pty) Ltd 
27.0 29.8 25.5 25.5 25.3 24.7 -8.8 
Other 
 
      -9.6 
Self-administered 
 
9.8 10.2 9.2 8.5 6.6 6.7 -31.6 
Momentum Medical 
Scheme Administrators 
(Pty) Ltd 
6.0 4.5 3.8 3.1 2.9 3.0 -50.0 
V Med Administrators 
(Pty) Ltd 
3.4 2.7 1.9 1.6 1.2 1.2 -64.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Source: Council for Medical Schemes (2015/2016:194) 
 
The following section explains the time horizon over which the study was 
conducted. 
 
3.2.5  Time horizon for the study 
 
The time horizon over which a study is conducted can be either longitudinal or 
cross-sectional (Sunders et al., 2012). Longitudinal studies are conducted over 
a period of time, where the same population is investigated (Beins, 2013). In 
contrast, a cross-sectional study is conducted once-off and is usually 
associated with surveys and case studies (Sunders & Tosey, 2012/2013). For 
this study, the time horizon was cross-sectional, as data was collected at a 
single point in time, due to limited time and resources. The next section 
describes the population for this study. 
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3.2.6 Population  
 
McDaniel and Gates (2013) defined a population or universe as all the people 
or entities that will give information to advance the objectives of the research.  
The population for this study was all the employees at the medical scheme 
administrator selected as a case study, as described in section 3.2.4.2. 
However, the population excluded employees who were not tasked with fraud 
management activities in their daily work functions. 
 
The following section explain the sampling techniques and sample used for this 
study. 
 
3.2.7 Sampling techniques 
 
A sample is a subset of people or entities selected from the population intended 
to represent the entire population or the universe (De Vos et al., 2011). There 
are two main types of sampling techniques, namely probability and non-
probability sampling (Wiid & Digginess, 2013). Probability sampling techniques 
are mainly categorised into simple, stratified, complex, systematic, double and 
cluster sampling techniques (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). Non-probability 
sampling techniques, which are characterised by smaller sample sizes, are 
mainly used by qualitative researchers, with the aim of gaining a deeper 
understanding from study participants (Cooper & Schindler, 2014:167). Types 
of non-probability sampling techniques identified by De Vos et al. (2011) are 
purposive sampling, theoretical sampling, deviant case sampling, sequential 
sampling, snowball sampling, key informant sampling and volunteer sampling. 
 
A purposive non-probability sampling method was used to select the study 
participants from the selected case in this study. According to Rule and John 
(2011), a purposive sampling method allows the researcher to choose 
participants who can shed more light, with requisite knowledge, interest and 
experience with the case; and who can provide most valuable insightful 
information with no intention of selecting a representative sample. A purposive 
sampling method was considered appropriate for selecting participants for the 
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study. In line with purposive sampling, the participants were selected on the 
basis that the knowledge and insight they provided would advance the purpose 
of the study.  
 
3.2.7.1 Sample for the study  
 
In order to understand the structure of the company, an organogram of the 
company was discussed with the gatekeeper, who is the senior manager in the 
clinical risk management department. In consultation with the gatekeeper, the 
study participants were purposively selected according to their function, and 
included clinical risk management and forensics. These departments were 
important because they advanced the purpose of the study, since more insight 
and knowledge was provided due to their exposure to fraud-related activities in 
their daily functions.  
 
The selection criteria also ensured that participants with different areas of 
expertise were covered, and included, inter alia: hospital services, pathology, 
intermediary (brokers), banking, nursing, analytics, surveillance, probes, 
ambulance services, healthcare fraud, pharmacy and undercover investigation. 
Data was gathered from study participants until no new categories emerged 
from the interviews, as recommended by Creswell (2014). Saturation of the 
data was reached after the thirteenth interview. However, the researcher 
interviewed two more study participants because meetings had already been 
scheduled with them. At the end of the interview process, a total of 15 study 
participants had been interviewed across the aforementioned departments, as 
shown in Table 3.3 below. 
 
Table 3.3: Departmental matrix of the study participants 
Department Clinical Risk Management Forensics 
Senior management 1 1 
Middle management 1 1 
Specialists 3 8 
Source: Author  
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In the next section, data collection techniques employed in the study are 
discussed. 
 
3.2.8 Data collection  
 
Two types of data are used in research studies, namely primary and secondary 
data sources (Wiid & Digginess, 2013). According to Wiid and Digginess 
(2013), primary data is data that has not been collected previously, and is 
gathered with the aim of addressing the specific research problem or objective 
of the study.  In contrast, the secondary data entails information that is already 
in existence and may assist in reaching the objective of the study (McDaniel Jr 
& Gates, 2013). The primary data collection methods commonly employed in 
qualitative research are observations, interviews, document analysis and 
audio-visual materials (Creswell, 2014). Interviews may either be conducted 
through a focus group, where data is collected from a group of people at the 
same time (Myers, 2013:252), or on an individual basis, where the researcher 
gathers data from one study participant at a time (Wiid & Digginess, 2013). 
There are three basic types of interviews, namely structured interviews, semi-
structured interviews and unstructured interviews (Myers, 2013).  
 
3.2.8.1 Interview questions 
 
Beins (2013) distingished between two types of questions based on the 
response structure, namely open-ended questions and closed-ended 
questions. Open-ended questions permit the participant to provide an answer 
without pre-determined responses. Therefore, the study participant, without 
limitations, generates the answer (Beins, 2013). Thus, in order to identify the 
fraudulent activities perpetrated against South African medical schemes, as 
well as strategies to migate this crime, open- ended questions were included in 
the interview schedule. These questions were based on the steps of the risk 
management process, which include risk identification, evaluation, control, 
financing and monitoring (Young, 2014). Saunders et al. (2012) purported that 
open-ended questions are widely utilised for in-depth and semi-structured 
interviews, and are useful if the reseacher is unsure of the response, such as 
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in exploratory research. The open-ended questions also allowed for probing 
and for the participant to give information freely, without being restricted to 
specific responses, as in closed-ended questions. These questions also 
allowed rich insights and knowledge to be acquired from the research 
participants. Please refer to  Appendix A for the interview schedule that guided 
the researcher during the interviews. 
 
3.2.8.2 Pilot testing 
 
De Vos et al. (2011) emphasised the importance of conducting a pilot study, 
irrespective of whether the study is quantitative or qualitative. As recommended 
by Saunders et al. (2012), an expert was initially consulted in order to evaluate 
the structure, content and suitability of the questions. The relevant suggestions 
from the expert were incorporated into the questions before a further test was 
performed with two other experts occupying senior management positions at 
the scheme administrator selected for this study. After the pilot testing was 
conducted with two more experts, their propositions were taken into 
consideration, ambiguous questions were clarified, duplicate questions were 
removed, and additional questions were included to cater for omitted topics, in 
order to create the final version of the interview schedule that was used for the 
study. 
 
3.2.8.3 Semi-structured interviews 
 
For this study, semi-structured interviews were viewed as superior to other 
interview types, and were thus selected as a data collection method. According 
to Polonsky and Waller (2011), semi-structured interviews are organised by 
researchers, with the aim of covering a range of questions which are relevant 
to the topic at hand, by utilising mainly open-ended questions. Furthermore, a 
semi-structured interview is the type of interview that uses the best of both 
structured and unstructured interviews, as it gives some structure, while at the 
same time allowing for some improvisation. This gives the interviewee the 
opportunity to add important insights as they arise during the course of the 
conversation (Myers, 2013).  
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3.2.8.4 Preparatory phase 
 
A participant information sheet was provided to the selected study participants, 
in order to explain the purpose of the study and what was expected in the 
interviews. Individual face-to-face interviews were scheduled with each 
participant. An appointment was made with each participant, with the 
assistance of the gatekeeper, for a period of 60 minutes at a convenient time 
and place.  
 
3.2.8.5 Interview phase 
 
Interviews were conducted in the medical scheme administrator’s various 
boardrooms, in order to ensure that no interruptions occurred during the course 
of primary data collection. The researcher greeted the participant and 
introduced herself before the interview commenced. Prior to commencing each 
interview, the participants were also allowed to ask questions to clarify any 
issues. Written consent was also obtained for conducting audio-recorded 
interviews with each participant. Data was collected in the month of May 2016, 
guided by the interview schedule. An audio- recorder was utilised as a tool to 
record the interviews, and the researcher also took notes. During the interview, 
the researcher was able to probe and clarify any ambiguous responses. Once 
the interview was completed, the researcher closed the interview and thanked 
the participant for agreeing to be part of the study. The duration of each 
interview ranged from 7 to 64 minutes. 
 
3.2.8.6 Data triangulation 
 
The senior manager indicated that an anonymous tip-off line, which is managed 
by an independent company, is utilised for the reporting of fraudulent activities 
perpetrated against medical schemes under the management of the medical 
scheme administration company. In addition, a fraud policy is in place to guide 
fraud mitigation activities. Furthermore, the company has a fraud detection 
system to identify fraudulent claims. The researcher was taken on a walk by the 
senior manager, who showed her the team which manages the fraud mitigation 
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activities in the medical administration company. It was observed that the 
personnel managing fraud had various requisite qualifications and skills to 
manage fraud. Internally, annual and monthly reports are generated to classify 
and track the type of fraud which is encountered. Furthermore, the company is 
regularly invited to stakeholder group (for instance, doctors, hospitals) 
conferences, in order to present on fraud experiences of medical schemes, 
thereby increasing awareness. The company also attended multi-insurers’ 
forums, which comprise of medical schemes and short-term insurers, to discuss 
matters related to fraud. 
  
The following section describes the data analysis procedures used in this study. 
 
3.2.9  Data analysis  
 
According to Creswell (2014), analysis of qualitative data involves breaking 
down text or image data and re-assembling it to derive meaningful findings. 
Thematic data analysis was employed in this study. Thematic data analysis 
involves the coding of data, whereby the researcher absorbs data to derive 
“meaning, connections and insights” (Polonsky & Waller, 2011:160). According 
to Creswell (2013:190), data analysis in qualitative case studies starts with 
creating and organising data. Vaismoradi, Turunen and Bondas (2013) posited 
that the researcher should read to become familiar with collected data. 
 
Thereafter, codes should be generated from the data across all interview 
transcripts (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). In addition, codes should be categorised 
to form common themes and label these themes (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). 
Themes form the basis for the main research findings (Creswell, 2014:199). In 
conclusion, an analysis report should be produced in relation to the research 
questions of the study (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). Creswell (2014) indicated that 
qualitative data could be interpreted by relating data from the literature review 
to the research findings. Furthermore, Creswell (2013:191) stated that data in 
case studies could be presented in the form of tables and figures.  
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The researcher followed the data analysis spiral recommended by Creswell 
(2013), which involves first organising the data, followed by reading and 
memoing. Thereafter, the data is described and classified into codes and 
themes, and then interpreted. The final step involves representing and 
visualising the data. 
 
Step 1:  Firstly, audio-recorded data collected through interviews was saved 
on computer. Data was transcribed from audio to text by the 
transcriber. In order to protect the confidentiality of the company 
selected as a case, as well as individual study participants, the 
transcriber signed a confidentiality agreement form (see Appendix 
D). Transcribed data was reviewed to delete any information that 
could identify the study participants or the company, in order to 
ensure confidentiality. Individual transcripts were uploaded onto 
ATLAS.ti, a qualitative data analysis software program. The software 
allocated each transcript a label, for instance P1, which represents 
primary document one. 
 
Step 2:  The researcher read the transcripts in conjunction with the field 
notes, in order to familiarise herself with the data, and initial codes 
were recorded on paper.  
 
Step 3:  After immersing herself in the data, the researcher identified codes 
with the aid of ATLAS.ti. Similar codes were categorised to form 
themes, which are called families in the Atlas.ti program. 
 
Step 4:  Identified themes were interpreted with the aid of existing literature. 
 
Step 5:  As suggested by Creswell (2014), information was then summarised 
into meaningful findings, in order to present the research findings in 
thick descriptions, and quotes from study participants, in order to 
afford them a voice. The results were also presented with the aid of 
thematic maps derived from ATLAS.ti software. Figures and tables 
56 
 
were used to present the findings, so as to enable the reader to 
visualise the results of the study.  
 
The next section discusses measures taken to ensure the trustworthiness of 
the study. 
 
3.3 Measures to ensure trustworthiness 
 
Rule and John (2011) highlighted the fact that Guba (1981) suggested the 
concept of trustworthiness in qualitative research as an alternative measure of 
quality, instead of validity and reliability, which promotes values that include 
scholarly rigour, transparency  and professional ethics. Creswell (2013) 
mentioned that Guba (1985) recommended that the trusworthiness of 
qualitative studies is achieved by focusing on the study’s transferability, 
credibility, dependability, authenticity and confirmability. Rule and John 
(2011:107) also pointed out that “full disclosure of the research process; 
including limitations, researcher positionality and ethical requirements, helps to 
ensure the dependability and confirmability of a case study”.  
 
The eight strategies to ensure credibility and trustworthiness of research 
findings, as proposed by Creswell (2014:201-202), are as follows: 
 
 Spending a lengthy time in the field, 
 Triangulation of various data sources,  
 Member checking aimed at validating research findings with study 
participants, 
 Provision of thick descriptors of themes in the findings, 
 Presenting findings of negative cases, 
 Peer review to ensure accuracy of the findings, 
 Describing the researcher’s bias, and 
 Auditing the entire research project.   
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Creswell (2013:253) suggested that a minimum of two of these strategies 
should be applied in qualitative research. 
 
In order to ensure the credibility of this study, the research participants were 
provided with an information sheet introducing the researcher, as well as 
explaining the purpose of the study and what their participation entailed. 
Interviews were conducted by the researcher to enhance the credibility of the 
findings. As recommended by Creswell (2013), detailed and thick descriptions 
were provided on the themes, thereby permitting the audience to evaluate the 
issue of transferability and allowing for external validity. Audio-recorded 
interviews, transcripts and field notes were stored to enhance the auditability of 
the research findings. Recording the interviews and transcribing the recordings 
boosted the auditability of the findings (Creswell, 2013). The research process, 
limitations and ethical requirements were fully explained, in order to enhance 
the dependability and confirmability of the study. Lastly, the entire research 
project was subjected to a review by a critical reader. 
 
In the following section, the ethical issues considered in this study are 
explained. 
 
3.4 Ethical considerations 
 
Rule and John (2011) purported that conducting research in an ethically sound 
manner enhances the quality of research and contributes to its trustworthiness. 
Ethical issues that were considered whilst conducting this study are discussed 
below. 
 
3.4.1    Protection from harm 
 
According to Polonsky and Waller (2011), the researcher should ensure that 
the participants are not harmed physically, emotionally or psychologically, 
which may be manifested in the form of visible physical injuries, resentment, 
anxiety, embarrassment or the reliving of unpleasant memories. In this study, 
data was collected in such a way that the participants were not harmed at all. 
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3.4.2    Maintenance of privacy 
 
The research results were handled in such a manner that they could not be 
traced or linked to individual participants. Once the interview transcripts had 
been analysed,  the results were reported by assigning serial names to 
participants, such as P1, P2 etc., as allocated by the ATLAS.ti software. 
 
3.4.3    Coercion 
 
The participants were not forced, intimidated or pressured in any way to 
participate in the study. Informed written consent was requested and obtained 
from each participant.The study participants were also informed that their 
participation was on a voluntary basis. 
 
3.4.4    Informed consent 
 
The research participants should be fully informed of the purpose and methods 
of the research, as well as the potential use of the results (Layder, 2013). 
Moreover, Layder (2013) stated that participants should be informed of what 
participation entails, and any risk should be communicated. For this study, 
ethical clearence was obtained from the university before data was collected 
from study participants (see Appendix B for the ethical clearance certificate). 
Consent to gain permission to conduct a case study was also requested 
through a written letter to the chief executive officer at the selected medical 
scheme administrator. The letter detailed the topic, purpose, objectives and 
methodology of the study. The manner in which the company could assist in 
the study was also explained in the letter. Written consent was granted by the 
company, and a gatekeeper (a senior manager at the medical scheme 
administrator) was allocated to the researcher as a contact person for the 
duration of the study. In addition, written consent was obtained from each 
participant before the interview was conducted (see Appendix C).  
 
The purpose and objectives of the research were explained to the participants. 
The individual conducting the research was also introduced to the participants. 
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Furthermore, details regarding the interview, where the participant would have 
to answer questions, and the duration thereof, were communicated to the 
participants.  
 
3.4.5    Confidentiality 
 
Confidentiality involves protecting the identity of the participants in the study 
and ensuring that all identifiable data remains with the researcher and is not 
divulged in the report (Polonsky & Waller, 2011). The findings were made 
confidential and none were associated with a specific participant. Personal data 
comprising of the names and contact details of participants was also stored in 
a different location from the research data, and participants were allocated 
serial numbers, as recommended by Ritchie, Lewis, Nicholls and Ormston 
(2014), in order to ensure that the confidentiality of study participants was 
protected. The transcriber of data from audio to text also signed a confidentiality 
agreement form (see Appendix D). 
 
3.4.6    Beneficence 
 
The principle of beneficence, which relates to the view that the study 
participants should benefit from the research that is being undertaken 
(University of South Africa, 2014:10), was considererd during the study. Once 
the research was completed and vetted by the university, the results of the 
study were shared with the scheme administrator, which was chosen as a case 
study, for the benefit of the company. Lessons learned and the results of the 
study would consequently assist in the reduction of the amount expended on 
fraudulent claims, thereby increasing the reserves and improving the financial 
viability of medical schemes. In the following section, the methodological issues 
and limitations of the study are discussed. 
 
3.5    Methodological issues and limitations 
 
Qualitative research methodology was adopted in the study, and one medical 
scheme administrator was selected, in order to collect data from only 15 
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purposively selected participants. This limited the generalisability of the 
research findings to all South African medical schemes. The aim of the study 
was to gain an in-depth understanding of fraud in medical schemes, with no 
intention to generalise the findings. The data collection method employed, 
namely interviews, may intimidate the study participants. However, the 
researcher built a rapport with each study participant to ensure that there was 
a conducive atmosphere before the audio-recorded interview commenced.  
 
3.6    Conclusion 
 
This chapter outlined the theory underpinning research designs and 
methodology. The manner in which the research design and metholodogy were 
applied to the study was detailed. An inductive approach was adopted, as the 
study aimed to explore how medical schemes can mitigate fraud risk. 
Therefore, a qualitative research methodology was followed. A case study 
strategy was chosen for this study, and one medical scheme administrator was 
selected as a case. Data was collected from the purposively selected sample. 
The data analysis procedures employed were also explained in this chapter. 
Lastly, the manner in which ethical issues were considered while conducting 
the study was also discussed.  
 
The next chapter discusses the findings and interprets the results of the study. 
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CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, the research methodology which was used to answer 
the research questions was explained. This chapter presents the findings of the 
study, based on the following objectives, namely to:  
 
 Identify the types of fraudulent activities perpetrated against South African 
medical schemes; and 
 Examine strategies to mitigate fraud in South African medical scheme 
claims. 
 
4.2 Profile of the participants 
 
There were 15 participants from both genders, comprising of 10 females and 
five males. They occupied specialist or managerial positions at the selected 
medical scheme administrator. All the study participants were involved in fraud 
management activities in their daily duties. Five study participants worked in 
the clinical risk management department, whilst 10 worked in the forensic 
division. The information gathered from the study participants provided a broad 
and rich perspective on fraud in medical scheme claims, as participants with 
different areas of expertise, including hospital services, pathology, brokers, 
banking, nursing, analytics, surveillance, probes, ambulance services, 
healthcare fraud, pharmacy and undercover investigation, were interviewed. 
 
4.3 Central themes 
 
A thematic approach was used in the study, where data was categorised into 
themes and sub-themes. There were two main themes, and the themes and 
subthemes are presented in Table 4.1 below. 
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Table 4.1: Themes and sub-themes 
Themes Sub-themes 
 
Identification of risks 
 Service provider fraud 
 Medical scheme member fraud 
 Employee fraud 
 Broker fraud 
 Collusion 
 Syndicated fraud 
Strategies to mitigate fraud in 
medical scheme claims 
 Internal control measures 
 Reporting of fraud 
 Stakeholder collaboration 
Source: Author 
 
The central question in this study was the following: How can South African 
medical schemes mitigate fraud in claims? The presentation and analysis of the 
findings follows in the next sections. The findings are reported with supporting 
quotes from the interview transcripts. Table 4.2 below illustrates the reference 
system used to report participants’ quotes from the interview transcripts. 
 
Table 4.2: Reference system to report quotes from interview transcripts 
Example 4:3 
The number 4 represents primary document four on ATLAS.ti 
The number 3 represents quotation number three in primary document 4 
Source: Author 
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4.4 Types of fraudulent activities committed against medical 
schemes 
 
The first research question sought to determine the types of fraudulent 
activities that were perpetrated against South African medical schemes. These 
were: 
 Service provider fraud, 
 Medical scheme member fraud  
 Employee fraud 
 Broker fraud 
 Collusion 
 Syndicated fraud 
 
The thematic analysis of the six subthemes in relation to fraudulent activities 
committed against medical schemes is presented in the following subsections. 
The findings regarding fraudulent activities perpetrated against medical 
schemes were categorised into service provider fraud, medical scheme 
member fraud, broker fraud, syndicated fraud, and collusion between medical 
scheme members and service providers. 
 
4.4.1 Service provider fraud  
 
One of the participants highlighted that the service providers act differently 
across various medical schemes, thereby implying that certain providers 
deliberately target a specific medical scheme for fraud. Service providers were 
found to be committing fraud utilising various methods. These methods involved 
false claims, irregular billing of codes, excessive billing for products and 
services, provision of unnecessary medical services, duplicate claims, excluded 
products and benefits claimed as covered benefits, and claims from unlicensed 
service providers. 
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4.4.1.1 False claims  
 
The most reported form of service provider fraud by the study participants was 
false claims, which were submitted to the medical scheme for services not 
rendered or products not supplied to members. Similarly, Norjé and Hoffmann 
(2014, 2015a, 2016) found that fraudulent activities committed by South African 
healthcare professionals were mostly related to billing for services not 
rendered. Some of the participants were quoted as saying the following: 
 
…they are also claiming for services not rendered, it could be, okay, that 
medicine is one of them, but they are also claiming for certain procedures not 
performed (4:3).  
 
Then we found out the physio put in false claims (9:45). 
 
Then there is also the fact that some providers will claim for things that they 
didn't do (2:2). 
 
…claiming for meds [medicines] that have not actually been dispensed (6:4). 
 
The participants further indicated that some of the doctors who owned 
ambulance service companies falsified claims, in order to appear as if the 
doctor treated the patient in the ambulance, whereas the patient was actually 
treated in the doctor’s consultation rooms. The doctors also misrepresented 
claims to make it seem as if care was provided by them in the ambulance, 
instead of by the ambulance staff during the transportation of the patient to the 
hospital. One of the participants was quoted as saying:  
 
So he would [the general practitioner] give the patient something like that, so 
the level of care shoots up to the highest level of care.  He would then hand the 
patient over to the lowest level of care staff, to Basic Life Support staff. Then 
he would insinuate that he was on the ambulance, by writing his name on the 
PRF, even though he wasn’t there (8:7).  
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This shows that the General Practitioner (GP) is charging for attending to the 
patient in the ambulance, when he was not available. The main reason for this 
is that patients are charged a lot for being treated in emergencies, such as in 
ambulances. It can be noted that false claims are associated with claiming for 
services not rendered, procedures not performed, and medicines not 
dispensed. 
 
4.4.1.2 Irregular billing of codes 
  
Coding irregularities were reported, whereby service providers up-code (claim 
for a code of a higher value than the actual service or treatment provided). The 
definition of up-coding in this study is similar to the one advanced by Rashidian 
et al. (2012) as earlier stated in subsection 2.4.5. 
 
Furthermore, codes were manipulated by billing for extra codes (code padding) 
and through the unbundling of codes (billing for several codes instead of one 
inclusive code), in order to defraud medical schemes. This is expressed in the 
following quotes by participants: 
 
So all types of fraud that I have worked with in the health sector are mainly to 
do with coding. Providers use billing codes that are not the right codes to use 
for the specific procedure or consultation, and this is all according to the DPM, 
which is the Doctors Billing Manual, so I must set it up and we work according 
to that (7:1). 
 
Providers that up-code…That use codes of higher value for a procedure similar 
in nature (6:1). 
 
There are instances where service providers routinely charge for certain 
procedures for every patient who was treated, irrespective of the service that 
was actually rendered. This is highlighted in the following participant’s quote: 
 
Uhm, what another chiropractor was doing is, he had a standard bundle of 
codes which he would submit for every single patient. So even though he might 
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do x, y, z and bill for x, y, z on this patient, if he was only doing x on the other 
patient, he was still billing for x, y, z (8:16). 
 
Ambulance services also defrauded the medical schemes by billing for each 
patient, even though one ambulance was used to transport multiple patients.  
 
If they take two patients, they will pay 100% for one patient, 75% for the second 
patient, 50% for the third patient, and we won’t pay for any patients after 
that...So they would take two or three, sometimes more patients, depending on 
their injuries, and they would bill us 100% for each patient (8:3). 
 
Similar to the findings of this study, irregular billing of codes was also reported 
in the study conducted by Bauder et al. (2017). The findings indicate that 
irregular billing of codes occurs amongst healthcare service providers, in order 
to maximise the amount of funds payable by medical schemes for healthcare 
claims. This type of fraud is committed by either charging for extra codes (code 
padding) for services not rendered, billing for a higher code than the service 
provided, or by upgrading the level of care. 
 
4.4.1.3 Excessive billing for services and products 
 
Excessive billing for services and products was found in cases where, for 
instance, service providers charged for excessive time.  A physiotherapist was 
found to be billing excessive time for services rendered to patients, as well as 
for services not rendered. This is explained in the following participant’s quote: 
 
One physiotherapist was found to be booking for 45 minutes a session, but he 
was only staying 15 minutes, and then he was saying that he was travelling up 
to 200 kilometres.  For example, one subject, or one patient, was in Vereeniging 
- he never even went to them, but yet he still billed us (5:2). 
 
At times, providers supplied members with cheap products, but claimed for 
more expensive ones. This is articulated in the following participant’s quote: 
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Okay, from my point of view, certain providers commit fraud through dispensing 
cheap medicine and claiming for more expensive medicine (4:45). 
 
Ambulance services also defrauded the medical scheme by billing for waiting 
periods that were not medically necessary. 
 
Uhm, otherwise they send an ambulance from the other side of Jo’burg to here, 
and then they bill us for the whole long response as well.  So we allow per 
kilometre to a scene, it must be close, uhm, then they will bill us for the time 
that they actually spent on the scene. So if a person isn’t injured or they are 
only slightly injured, but they are walking around, and they want to wait for the 
tow truck to take their car, and they want to wait for the police and they want to 
wait for this one and that one (8:5).   
 
Some providers were not adhering to specific billing arrangements signed with 
the medical scheme, as explained in the following participant’s quote: 
 
I am busy with ophthalmology at the moment. So xxxx (specific medical 
scheme) has an agreement with some ophthalmologists. They signed a 
contract saying that they will only bill cost price for an intraocular lens, but they 
are not billing cost price.  So I work out what the difference is between the cost 
price and the amount that they are billing, and we need to get that money back, 
because that is money that is not supposed to go to them (7:2). 
 
Similar to the findings of this study, fraud relating to excessive billing for 
healthcare services and products was also reported by Flynn (2016) and 
Abdallah et al. (2016). Unlike previous studies (Flynn, 2016; Thornton et al., 
2015), this study found that service providers sometimes failed to bill according 
to the agreement, where a specific network is in place to standardise costs for 
healthcare services with a specific group of healthcare providers. 
 
4.4.1.4 Provision of unnecessary medical services 
 
Medical scheme members are sometimes provided with a service that is not 
medically indicated, or a healthcare service is rendered that is over and above 
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what is required. This type of fraud is explained in the following participant’s 
quote: 
 
So, for example, at a rugby match, if a high school student was heavily tackled, 
and he was complaining that he was a little bit sore…, the ILS would put up a 
drip, so he is no longer on Intermediate Life Support.  This means that he is no 
longer a Basic Life Support patient because it is not within their scope of 
practice to manage a drip, and they would take him to hospital.  So the question 
is now: Why did you put up a drip? If the patient is hemodynamically stable, 
their blood pressure is fine.  There is no Advanced Life Support there to give 
an analgesic, so what is the purpose of putting up a drip?  Because just for 
putting in that R12.00 Jelco and putting up a R15.00 vaculitre of fluid, they 
charge the medical aid another R1500.00 (8:28). 
 
One case that was investigated by the medical scheme administrator revealed 
that a doctor committed fraud by recruiting some members. The doctor gave 
these members a drug to induce medical symptoms. Thereafter, the member 
was admitted to the hospital for an invasive procedure, where a medically 
unnecessary pacemaker was inserted, simply for financial gain. This type of 
fraud is described in the following participant’s quote: 
 
Okay, let me tell you about this. We found that this doctor was approaching 
members and giving a drug to them.  The members, after obviously agreeing 
with the doctor to get paid a certain amount, excluding the hospital time and 
whatever, were physically operated on to get these pacemakers (13:9). 
 
This finding indicates that service providers sometimes provided unnecessary 
services, which concurs with the findings of Pande and Maas (2013). The 
impact of this practice could harm the patient. For instance, one physician 
blinded some psychiatric patients after performing unnecessary eye operations 
(Pande & Maas, 2013). Providers go to the extent of performing a surgical 
operation that is not necessary, merely for financial gain, which could put the 
health of the member at risk.  
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4.4.1.5 Duplicate claims 
 
Providers also submitted duplicate claims. There were instances reported 
where the same claim was billed to both the member and the medical scheme, 
resulting in the service provider receiving two payments for the same claim. The 
following quote explains how the duplicate billing for services occurs in 
pathology: 
 
It is fraud and sometimes they would do this. They will send the claim through 
to the medical aid and we will pay, and then they will send the member a 
statement, but because the public is generally not educated enough, they pay 
what is on the statement.  Now you have providers sitting with these double 
payments.  (2:31). 
 
Similar to the finding of this study, the submission of duplicate claims to defraud 
healthcare funders was reported by Thornton et al. (2013). It appears that 
duplicate claims are involved where service providers are paid twice for the 
same healthcare service or product provided to the medical scheme member. 
Funds for the same claim are sometimes received from both the medical 
scheme and the member.  
 
4.4.1.6 Excluded products and benefits claimed as covered benefits 
 
Providers claim for services or products that the medical scheme covers, but 
sometimes supply excluded products to medical scheme members - for 
example, cash. The following quotes explain this type of fraud: 
 
So different providers are doing different stuff. For example, optometrists are 
supplying sunglasses and claiming for spectacles. So, each provider has a 
different type of fraud in his field (4:4).  
 
Psychologists, physiotherapists, they give cash and they claim ten times for 
seeing the member ten times, whereas they gave cash (4:20).  
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The finding of this study is similar to that of Flynn (2016) in Australia. Excluded 
products provided by service providers evidently include cash (money) and 
sunglasses, which are not related to the treatment of health ailments. This could 
put a strain on the financial resources of medical schemes. 
 
4.4.1.7 Unlicensed service providers 
 
The providers also defraud medical schemes by utilising unqualified and 
unregistered service providers. This finding is similar to that of Norjé and 
Hoffmann (2016), who reported that some healthcare service providers were 
misrepresenting their qualifications. 
 
…if it is a locum [stand-in], but most of the time the real doctor, if he is not there, 
he is aware of what is going on, and he uses the locum, the bogus doctor.  We 
had a scam also in Pretoria a couple of years ago, where certain Nigerians 
were in practice together. Every day it was a different doctor, then we realized 
it is not a real doctor (4:48). 
 
Allowing unlicensed people to provide healthcare services and products could 
have dire consequences. The risk of unregistered entities providing healthcare 
services was highlighted in the South African public sector, after outsourcing 
psychiatric healthcare services to unregistered institutions resulted in 91 deaths 
(Office of the Health Ombud, 2017).  
 
Fraudulent claims were submitted to medical schemes by service providers, 
according to Norjé and Hoffmann (2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016). The 
aforementioned subsection reported the findings of this study, which 
demonstrated the ways in which service providers defraud medical schemes. 
Service providers were found to be committing fraud utilising various methods, 
as thematically depicted in Figure 4.1 below. 
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Figure 4.1 Types of service provider fraud 
Source: Author 
 
The following section presents the findings related to member fraud. 
 
4.4.2 Medical scheme member fraud  
 
The study found that members defraud the scheme through card farming and 
by not disclosing pre-existing medical conditions at the application stage.  
 
4.4.2.1 Card farming  
 
Members are defrauding medical schemes through card farming, which occurs 
when members share their medical scheme benefits with non-members. 
Debpuur et al. (2015) found a similar type of fraud occurring in the Ghanaian 
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healthcare system. Card farming is explained in the following participants’ 
quotes: 
 
It could be what we call card farming, and this happens a lot more often than 
most people realise. Because it is hard to detect and most people who don't 
have medical aid then use another person’s medical aid card.  Most of the time 
there is no form of ID required. So people just assume that you are who you 
say you are, and if this is your card and they verify your date of birth and name, 
it's basically the check that they are doing (2:1). 
 
Other types of fraud that we do see are what we refer to as card farming, it is 
a generalization, but we tend to see it more in female-owned policies.  So where 
a lady has multiple children, but cannot afford to have them all on her medical 
aid, she will cover herself and one of the children, but service all of the kids 
under that one entity (14:31). 
 
Then there are other forms of fraud when you’re in hospital, where uncovered 
people get access to medical schemes. They share it. (15:13). 
 
This type of fraud is reported to be prevalent with female members, who cover 
only one child on their medical scheme. However, all the children then share 
the benefits of that one child who has cover. 
 
4.4.2.2 Non-disclosure of pre-existing medical conditions  
 
Before joining the scheme, at the application stage, members fail to disclose 
pre-existing medical conditions, in order to avoid having to wait for the medical 
scheme cover to commence. 
 
…a type of fraud is non-disclosure on medical information (3:1). 
 
“So, okay as I said, I do strongly agree that fraud starts from when people join 
a medical scheme.  Okay, so not necessarily just their personal details, but the 
person knows that they will be underwritten, so they don’t disclose issues that 
they have (15:1). 
73 
 
 
From the above findings, it appears that some medical scheme members are 
not honest about their health status when applying to join the medical scheme. 
The non-disclosure of medical conditions results in medical schemes not 
applying the appropriate waiting periods, which disadvantages schemes with 
regard to cost containment measures. Medical scheme members also 
deliberately share their health benefits with illegible members, thereby putting 
a strain on the medical scheme’s financial resources. 
 
The next section presents findings related to fraud by medical scheme 
employees. 
 
4.4.3 Employee fraud 
 
The study found that medical scheme administrator employees commit fraud 
by submitting false claims and changing the banking details, in order to channel 
the funds claimed for services rendered to members to their own account. This 
type of fraud is explained in the following participant’s words: 
 
Then you get employees doing exactly the same thing as the other members. 
They will falsify scripts and claims, and then claim from the medical aid. (1:14). 
 
…if you have the power to process claims, you can decide if you want to pay 
the money into your own account, or if you want to pay the member.  Therefore, 
you change the banking details.  You can do that on medical aid claims …so 
when that amount is due, the employee can channel that into his own account 
and the member is none the wiser (1:15). 
 
The above findings of the study indicate that internal employees can defraud 
the medical scheme by submitting false claims or channelling the funds to their 
own account. To the researcher’s knowledge, this type of fraud has not been 
reported in previous studies.  
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4.4.4 Broker fraud 
 
Brokers were found to be perpetrating fraud against medical schemes by 
falsifying medical scheme membership applications. This is done by creating a 
false application for a member or non-existent employer group to the medical 
scheme, in order to earn commission. 
 
We picked up that clients or brokers don't – or let's start, brokers will write false 
policies, okay (9:53). 
 
From a health point of view, the brokers that submit business will falsify 
applications to get commission. They will, for instance, create employer groups 
and say that they are the broker representing Springbok Factory, which has 
three hundred employees, and that they are submitting medical aid applications 
for three hundred employees. However, the employees are fictitious, they do 
not exist.  It's like ghost employees. The broker gets commission and then after 
a while, no premiums are received and the business goes bang or something 
like that (1:17). 
 
Brokers also discourage members’ disclosure of pre-existing conditions, in 
order to avoid being underwritten and having waiting periods imposed.  
 
Then the second one we looked at is where a broker just writes a policy, but he 
doesn't disclose the medical history of the client, and just sends in the form.  
The client will say, for instance, that they have a heart problem, and the broker 
will just leave it out (9:43). 
 
To the researcher’s knowledge, previous studies in support of the findings on 
broker fraud were not found. This may be attributed to the different type of 
healthcare system that exist in the South African context. The findings of this 
study indicate that brokers commit fraud by submitting applications for non-
existing members, in order to earn commission. Furthermore, brokers also 
advise members not to disclose any pre-existing medical condition, which 
results in the medical scheme not applying waiting periods. The next section 
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present findings related to fraud committed through collusion between different 
parties. 
 
4.4.5 Collusion between members and service providers 
 
Collusion to defraud medical schemes occurs between service providers and 
medical scheme members, or between different service providers.  
 
4.4.5.1 Excluded benefits or non-medical items 
 
The member agrees with the service providers to access excluded services or 
non-medical items (for example, sunglasses and cash), by billing the medical 
scheme for covered benefits. This type of fraud is explained in the following 
participants’ quotes: 
 
On the scheme, when they know what’s not covered, members always find a 
way to get what’s not covered to be covered. They work with doctors as well, 
because the doctors approve it, and then the member can say that they are 
going for a hernia repair (5:19).   
 
AMC pots and condoms, as well as toiletries, are bought at the pharmacy, but 
at the end of the day, this accumulation of the improper use of your medical aid 
means that you are going to pay somewhere, somehow (2:21).   
 
4.4.5.2 Cash plan-related fraud 
 
Furthermore, collusion occurs when the member tries to access the hospital 
cash plan insurance benefits offered by short-term insurers fraudulently. The 
healthy member is admitted to the hospital, and the medical scheme pays for 
the hospital, doctor and related accounts. The member shares the cash (ATM) 
with the provider once the claims have been paid by the insurance company. 
This type of fraud is described in the following participant’s quote: 
 
In order to get that lump sum of cash paid out to them, they have to be sick, so 
they go to hospital for a number of days for no reason.  We pay that bill, and 
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then again, you are not questioning someone who is going in with bronchitis. 
You end up paying for three days of whatever has happened in the hospital, 
and the member then comes out and submits a claim for a bulk payment of 
cash, which comes to them. They obviously do not see that it has had an impact 
on their health cover as well, because we have paid for a fruitless admission 
(14:17).  
 
4.4.5.3 Hospital collusion with independent service providers 
 
In the case of members admitted to hospital, the hospitals collude with 
independent service providers by routinely providing access to the patient’s 
details, and allowing these providers to claim from the medical scheme for 
services not rendered, or which are provided in-house by the hospital. This 
practice is most prevalent with physiotherapists, nurses and dieticians. 
 
Independent nurses walk around in a hospital billing us, in addition to the 
hospital staff, for what the nurse is supposed to do. You find it a lot in the 
maternity environment (11:13). 
 
The problem is the dietician employed in their service. We should not be paying 
for this, and a big concern is the physiotherapist (11:8). 
 
They [hospitals] give them stickers. Because when they come to the hospital, 
there must be some sort of agreement or collusion within these examples that 
I gave you now (11:7). 
 
Collusion in medical scheme claims appears to occur among service providers 
or between service providers and medical scheme members, in order to access 
uncovered benefits. Once the medical scheme member is admitted to the 
hospital, allied service providers find a way to submit false claims. Hospital cash 
plan-related fraud appears to be unique to the South African context, because 
it was not previously reported in other countries. In this type of fraud, the 
medical scheme and short-term insurers are defrauded simultaneously. The 
next section discusses syndicated fraud. 
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4.4.6 Syndicated fraud  
 
Syndicated fraud may include medical scheme members, brokers, service 
providers, medical scheme employees, and any other person. 
 
A syndicate comprising only medical scheme members was reported by the 
participant. The members were targeting providers for cash. 
 
Syndicates, it all depends what syndicates, what type of syndicates, is it 
providers, members, you see...I had personal experience with providers giving 
cash, and we thought it was the providers, but at the end of the day, it was 
certain members that were targeting the providers in that area, by going to the 
providers and asking for cash.  So in the end the members were the syndicate, 
and not the providers (4:29). 
 
Through identity theft, the study found that the syndicates defraud medical 
schemes by submitting a medical scheme application for an unsuspecting 
member, Thereafter, they submit fictitious claims, purporting that the provider 
of the health service has been paid, and the member therefore has to be 
reimbursed. The refund is channelled to the syndicate’s bank account, details 
of which were given to the medical scheme. The bank account is then closed. 
Identity thieves who defraud healthcare insurance companies were also 
reported in Flynn’s (2016) study. 
 
Then you get fraud syndicates targeting the medical aid itself.  How it works, is 
that, they would commit identity theft, they would be in possession of copies of 
ID’s, water and lights accounts, proof of employment, salary statements, all that 
you need to prove that you are the person that work there and this is your 
income. Then they would submit medical aid applications of people without 
their knowledge, but their identities are being used by the fraudsters. However, 
that is not where the fraud comes in. The fraud comes in after we have activated 
the membership, when the same fraudsters submit false claims, where they 
indicate that the practice has already been paid, and xxxx [name of medical 
scheme] must please pay the member.  So the bank account that is loaded 
would be that of a fraudster, who submits the false claim on the false 
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membership into a once-off bank account. The minute they receive the money, 
they close the bank account and open up another one (1:16). 
 
Then what we also found is that they would give the false details at the 
application stage and go to the doctor with those details, and then they will get 
the doctor to write out a claim and a note that they paid them, and then they 
come here and put in the claim with us.  We pay it into their bank accounts, and 
they will do a lot of things like that, they will use either ten clients or they will 
put in a lot of claims on the one.  And then as soon as they've got R10 000 – 
R20 000 they stop, they disappear (9:39). 
 
Sometimes, the main aim of syndicates is not to defraud medical schemes, but 
to build a health profile that allows them to commit fraud on other products that 
the member has - for instance, hospital cash plans and life policies. 
 
The client will take out a policy with another intent, okay.  So what they will do 
is, they will take out a xxxx Health policy [medical scheme name] because 
there's for instance, cash-backs and stuff linked to that.  Or what they will 
actually do, they will start taking out a health policy to build a profile with us, 
because then later they will take xxxxx, then they will take a life policy, and then 
they will take a [onother product], which is actually their focus, the [onother 
product]… they will pay for the medical aid, they will use the benefits, and they 
will give false details at that stage, details which they researched prior, like ID 
numbers, addresses, clients, the person's identity that they're taking, salary 
and things like that.  Okay.  But their main... they will use that false information, 
get all those things and get the [onother product].  And then they will misuse 
the [onother product] and don't pay back, and then we sit with the [company] 
or the bank will sit with the loss (9:54). 
 
The syndicated fraud that was reported in this study occurred between medical 
scheme members and service providers, which at times target specific medical 
schemes. The member and the provider come to an agreement to submit false 
claims to the medical schemes, and then share the cash. 
 
Okay, xxxx [medical scheme name] has got their own medical aid, but let’s say, 
if our systems pick up that we receive a high volume of claims from certain 
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providers from xxxx [scheme name], then that would draw our attention to it.  
Because, why would a provider, it just makes sense logically that a provider 
would have an equal or a broad scope of patients all over. If it is only from xxxx 
[medical scheme name], it means that they are only targeting that group and it 
must be for a reason. (8:21). 
 
So on two of the medical schemes we uncovered syndicates, with our forensics 
team. It was found that health care providers who do not service these 
members submit claims. It happens between the provider and the member, 
they share the cash, a portion of that is, it is obviously between them, but they 
literally are defrauding the system. It is referred to as an ATM’ing scheme, 
where you literally go to your healthcare provider to get cash, and that is quite 
prominent in our space (14:24). 
 
There are also cases that were uncovered where the syndicate is amongst 
family members. The mode of operation of this type of syndicate involves 
referral of the same patients from one service provider to another, in order to 
defraud medical schemes. 
 
Ja, and often we find that, you know, syndicates might not be as elaborate as 
we think they are, but sometimes it is family members, so you would see a GP 
and an optician with the same surname, and they have got a high propensity 
of the same members, and it almost feels like a generation of income from one 
to the other.  So why would 99% of the GP’s patients go to the optician as well, 
you know, so those are the types of questions you ask, it is just those 
anomalies, what is that relationship (14:26). 
 
Yes, there will be a proportion of those where you actually have to refer for 
further investigations etcetera, and again, like with the optician example, if you 
are a GP, why are most of your patients coming to me again?  Do we all have 
eye problems, are we all going to the GP for eye problems? So then it feels just 
like the generation of income (14:27). 
 
Similar to this study, syndicated fraud was reported in Flynn (2016) study. The 
different types of scams include providers, family syndicates, members’ only 
syndicates, or syndicates involving only members of the public. The syndicate 
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submits a false application or bills for phantom claims. At times, the syndicate 
includes healthcare providers who are relatives, and they refer the same 
patients to each other, regardless of the medical necessity. 
 
In this section, the different ways in which South African medical schemes are 
defrauded were discussed. Service provider fraud was mostly reported by the 
participants. Medical scheme members, when sick, put their trust and even their 
lives in the hands of service providers. This is related to the fraud triangle 
theory, which proposes that people in positions of trust sometimes violate this 
trust by perpetrating fraud.  
 
The service providers are capable of manipulating and persuading medical 
scheme members to collude with them and defraud schemes for financial gain. 
This implies that the element of capability that was advanced by Wolfe and 
Hermanson (2004) in the diamond fraud theory is applicable to medical scheme 
fraud. Opportunity, one of the elements that allows fraud to occur, due to poor 
controls within the medical scheme, entices service providers, syndicates, 
members, internal employees and brokers to perpetrate fraud against medical 
schemes. This was evident in this study, as some of the fraudulent activities 
were specifically directed at certain medical schemes. Figure 4.2 below 
provides a diagrammatic presentation of the subthemes of types of fraudulent 
activities committed against medical schemes. 
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Figure 4.2 Sub-themes on types of fraudulent activities committed against 
medical schemes  
Source: Author 
 
The next section presents strategies that can be employed to mitigate fraud in 
medical scheme claims. 
 
4.5 Strategies to mitigate fraud in medical scheme claims 
 
Fraud-mitigating strategies encompass control measures that medical 
schemes can implement internally, reporting on fraud, and collaboration 
amongst various stakeholders, in order to curb medical scheme fraud.  
 
4.5.1 Internal control measures 
 
Internal controls refer to measures that the medical scheme can implement 
within the company to mitigate fraud. These measures are discussed in the 
ensuing subsection, and consist of directive controls, fraud detection controls, 
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and fraud prevention controls. Lastly, fraud corrective/ reactive control 
measures that are implemented once fraud has been confirmed are presented. 
 
4.5.1.1 Directive controls 
 
Blunden and Thirlwell (2013) stated that directive controls are put it place in 
order to provide guidance to the company, and are in the form of policies, 
procedures and manuals. COSO (2015) recommended that a fraud risk policy 
should be implemented when managing fraud. The participants spoke about 
the implementation of a fraud policy in the following quotes: 
 
I think the line that comes through all of it from the first to the last question is 
uhm. I don’t know if you want to summarise it there. Firstly, you must have a 
fraud policy. And then you must be able to act on that fraud policy by having 
proper measures in place (3:23). 
 
A policy without the will to implement the policy is meaningless, so if you had 
to tell me to have a policy implemented and it's very nice, yes, if you do not 
enforce that policy it I just words. So there is a word missing here. 
Implementing, communicating, and maintaining of fraud policy. Maintaining 
means you just keep it regular, up to date every year.  And enforcing [the fraud 
policy] (1:7). 
 
The results of the study indicate that a fraud policy should be the starting point 
in mitigating fraud in medical scheme claims. The policy should be 
implemented, maintained and communicated to all employees. For the policy 
to be effectively implemented, it must also be enforced. The medical scheme 
administration company confirmed that a fraud policy is in place to guide fraud 
management activities. The next section presents fraud detective measures. 
 
4.5.1.2 Fraud detective controls 
 
The purpose of detective control measures is to identify the risk as soon as it 
happens and then implement preventative control measures to curb the risk. 
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Detective control measures are categorised into whistle-blowing, fraud 
detection systems, audits, investigations, and sydicated fraud identification. 
 
a) Whistle-blowing  
 
Medical scheme members are encouraged to report fraud or suspected cases 
of it by means of whistle-blowing. This is explained in the following quotes by 
participants: 
 
Yes, and then also, you know what another thing is, is tip-offs from members 
or providers saying, a member came to my pharmacy and he wanted to claim 
for sunglasses, or optometrist, he wanted sunglasses on medical aid, you 
know, just people being honest (7:28). 
 
The other side of it is obviously then or tip offs from providers or members 
(10:16). 
 
…then we will, always we get a tip off or a whistle-blower that tells us this doctor 
does not look like a doctor, then we go and investigate, get the real doctor, you 
know, get a proper statement from, if he uses a locum we can also, only use a 
locum for a certain time, not permanently (4:13). 
 
The tip-offs received will be further investigated by the forensic team, in order 
to exclude or confirm fraud. The company that was selected as a case study 
reported that an anonymous tip-off line for reporting fraud is in place, which is 
managed by an independent company. 
 
b) Fraud detection system  
 
The fraud detection system mainly assists in continiously identifying irregular 
claiming patterns, as expalined by the following participants’ quotes:  
 
You must have system intelligence to verify procedures or items within a claim 
across claims for same people, same day even across different providers but 
all of it come down to proper systems (3:6). 
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But the system tells us, listen this person is claiming too much on the member, 
I think they are only allowed ten and the eleventh and the twelfth one came in, 
and that triggered that we had to look at it (9:14).   
 
Similar to the findings of this study, the importance of a fraud detection system 
in healthcare claims was also articulated by various authors (Wakoli et al., 
2014; Joudaki, et al., 2015; Abdallah et al., 2016). A fraud detection system is 
in place at the medical scheme administration company to identify fraudulent 
claims. Further investigation is carried out to evaluate the identified trend for 
fraud, so that appropriate control measures can be implemented. 
 
c) Audits 
 
The analysis is performed to examine a service provider and member claims, 
in order to identify irregular patterns and fraudulent claims manually or through 
reports. The claiming behaviour of providers is also benchmarked against 
providers in the same discipline, so as to identify outliers. This is described in 
the following participants’ quotes: 
 
You will find that somebody is saying that the person had a hernia.  That is the 
Doctor that did it right, but when you look at the hospital, they will give you a 
funny code and E code about obesity and God knows what else, then you 
know, there is something that does not add up here (2:27). 
 
We also run reports in the forensic space for duplicate claims (7:31) 
Retrospectively uhm again claims reviews to identify outlining trends and those 
need to be investigated (3:36). 
 
So the people doing the coding on that, or the audits will identify and then run 
a full audit on the practice (4:36) 
 
The audit or the report that we run on him to see that he is far ahead on his 
peers with his cost prescript or whatever, then we know what he is doing (4:42). 
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d) Investigations  
 
Fraud is detected through investigation, which could be undercover 
surveillence and by using personnel posing as medical scheme members, who 
use cameras to record the evidence. Moreover, on-site case management is 
also valuable in detecting fraud. The following participants’ quotes explain fraud 
investigation methods: 
 
Yes, you know, again the surveillance team also does that, we have got our 
probes that goes in, and they are actors, they pretend like they are sick, they 
go to the doctor, they say to the doctor listen here, I actually want cash for that, 
that is how we do it in the forensic team.  So also surveillance, also probes, we 
use our probes to do that, and that is a good preventative measure (7:29). 
They use cameras, they go into pharmacies, use cameras, they go into doctors 
rooms, use cameras, they, ja (7:27). 
 
So if we did do surveillance on him we would not have concrete evidence that 
this man is fraudulently claiming from the company, and that is what we were 
doing, and by doing that, documenting that, getting visual evidence of it by 
using, you know, video cameras and cameras we, and you know, exact times 
and dates where he was visiting, we would not have that evidence if we did not 
use surveillance (5:24) 
 
We have actually got an on-site case manager who visits these patients, we 
flag them, and she will report back and say there is nothing wrong with this 
patient, she or he is fine; but the Doctor has admitted them, they have been in 
hospital for that condition, so when they submit a claim for life insurance 
(14:30). 
 
Based on the above discussion, undercover investigation, surveillence and on-
site case management were suggested as measures to detect fraud. The 
investigation could involve undercover investigators posing as patients 
belonging to the medical scheme, with the aim of detecting fraud related to non-
covered benefits (e.g. cash) being provided to members, and then claiming 
them as covered benefits. This allows the investigators to gather solid evidence, 
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as hidden cameras are also used to capture the fraudulent act. On-site case 
management refers to when the medical scheme employee visits the medical 
scheme member who is admitted to hospital, in order to verify the clinical 
appropriateness of his or her admission. These visits also assist to detect cash 
plan-related fraud.  
 
e) Syndicated fraud identification  
 
All the above measures should be employed for syndicated fraud. In addition, 
inappropriate referrals between providers should be identified and examined to 
detect a potential syndicated fraud operation. Syndicates could also be 
identified through systematic linkages. Therefore, utilising analytics with 
different criteria will assist in identifying syndicates. For instance, proper system 
intelligence can help to identify members with huge claims at the inception of 
membership for further investigation. A huge variation in brokers’ sales should 
also be investigated. The study participants articulated these strategies in the 
following quotes: 
 
Ja, that's the … you see your system's got to... like this other one we spoke 
about where we got a lot of claims in from one member, and we found out that 
it's false because there were certain links that linked the members, so we found 
out that it was a syndicate there.  So your systems should actually help you a 
lot with that (9:36). 
 
Ja, so syndicates is often picked up in our data, it is based on members and 
who the, so if a member sees one provider and commits fraud it is very likely 
that if there was a syndicate operating there would be like a referral to other 
providers.  So to trend where members are going, you can see where they are 
going at a point in time, you can see the change of that trend over time, and 
also got what we refer to as a cluster analysis, so you can see where providers 
work closely together, and if that makes sense, so if a psychiatrist and a 
psychologist where working closely together it would make sense from a 
treatment action, but if a physiotherapist and a dietician, if two providers that 
do not necessarily make sense to have a very close relationship, those become 
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very questionable, so it is understanding a cluster of providers that work 
(14:28). 
 
The brokers, if I think of brokers now, if we get a sudden escalation in a broker's 
submission from an area, or a high percentage that is just suddenly submitting, 
then that should also be a red flag.  It can't – it's not a problem, but it's just got 
to be looked at, I mean that's preventative.  Let's say he sells five health 
policies.  Suddenly the next month he sells - individual policies - so the next 
month he starts selling ten group health policies.  That should raise a flag, 
because I mean you used to do individuals and now suddenly you're here with 
groups, and those groups can be usually your syndicates (9:33). 
 
Syndicated fraud is reported to be difficult to detect. However, extra measures 
could be employed to successfully identify syndicates. For instance, data 
analytics can be used to identify out-of-the-norm referrals and unusual trends. 
Further investigations of these anomalies are then conducted to exclude 
fraudulent activities. In the next section, preventative control measures are 
presented. 
 
4.5.1.3 Preventative control measures 
 
Fraud preventative controls stop the risk event from occuring (Young, 2014). 
The more difficult these controls are, the less the likelihood of fraud occuring, 
as this discourages fraudsters from trying repeatedly to commit this crime, 
thereby serving as a deterrent. Fraud awareness among  members and service 
providers, member verification at the point of service, benefit limits, automated 
system rejections, skilled personnel and a conducive working environment, 
segregation of duties, and prevention of syndicated fraud are presented in this 
subsection as preventative controls to mitigate medical scheme fraud claims. 
 
a) Fraud awareness among members and service providers 
 
Medical scheme members and service providers should be educated on fraud 
as a means of fraud prevention. Members are provided with a benefit schedule 
when joining the medical scheme, which details what is covered and excluded. 
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Members should also be educated about checking their medical scheme 
statement, in order to verify whether the service was provided. This type of 
control is explained in the following participants’ quotes: 
 
If members can be, not the member audit, if members can be informed that 
they must check out for fraud within providers, you know, because a lot of 
members get their statement at the end of the month from xxxx saying you went 
to this doctor, this was a claim, this was claimed, this was claimed, this comes 
off your Savings Account, then if you, you know, a lot of members do not even 
know what half of that things, you know, or the codes and stuff means, they are 
just like it is a statement from xxxx and close it, instead of going was I actually 
at this providers rooms, you know.  So also informing members (7:16). 
 
Members also receive a document when they sign up for the membership to 
what is excluded, what exclusions there is, so the member should be aware; 
and certain procedures they have to get authorization and then the medical aid 
will tell them listen, this is not a, this is excluded from the benefits so the 
member needs to pay cash (4:39). 
 
Awareness of both members and providers, awareness, proper awareness 
around fraud and collusion (3:40). 
 
Members’ education was also found by Flynn (2016) to be one of the healthcare 
fraud management measures to reduce fraudulent claims.  
 
b) Member verification at the point of service 
 
Members of medical schemes should be verified by service providers at the 
point of service, so as to prevent the servicing of non-members. Debpuur et al. 
(2015) also emphasised the importance of identification of members at the point 
of service to prevent card farming. This authentication could be done by 
requesting the identity document (ID) of the member and comparing it with the 
ID number on the medical scheme card. Furthermore, a biometric system could 
be implemented to mitigate card farming. Another suggestion was to put the 
member’s photograph on the medical scheme card, in order to enable the 
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service provider to identify the member. This is articulated in the following 
participants’ quotes:  
 
Obviously with your card, I would say to have a photograph put on of the 
member, you know, a photograph and the ID number so that would link them 
to that, you know, that would say this is the members there (5:17). 
 
I think if we could move towards biometric identity (2:23). 
 
Probably the only way would be by metric scan (10:13). 
 
…where the member can either use a finger print, so that it’s a unique 
identification (12:5). 
 
c) Benefit limits 
 
Implementing a proper benefit structure could mitigate fraudulent claims. 
Unlimited benefits should be avoided and, where appropriate, there should be 
a frequency limit in place, which limits the number of times the member can 
claim for certain healthcare benefits during a specified period. This is expressed 
in the following participants’ quotes: 
 
I would say proactively one of the, an important thing is the benefit structures 
so you should not have unlimited benefits for providers (3:34). 
 
So if I have a wheelchair this year, I should get one every year, you know. Or 
if you just put frequency limits in place (15:20). 
 
Applying limits to a member’s healthcare benefits is similar to the suggestion 
made by Debpuur et al. (2015). 
 
d) Automated system rejections 
 
Fraudulent behaviour that is known to the scheme should be prevented by 
establishing system rules that automatically reject these authorisations and 
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claims. Claims for excluded benefits and duplicate claims should be 
automatically rejected by the system, without manual intervention. 
 
We have rules built into the systems where certain providers, certain codes, as 
soon as the agent, the pre-authorisation agent puts that code or that provider 
in, the system will decline the event (8:19). 
 
The date, the treatment code or the nappi code for the medicines or whatever, 
the dependent or main member receiving treatment, the system will 
automatically detect if it is a  duplicate (1:19). 
 
This finding concurs with that in Nsiah-Boateng et al. (2017) study, which found 
that automated system rejection rules were effective in curbing the payment of 
duplicate claims in Ghana. Rejecting fraudulent claims for known fraud could 
save the medical scheme’s resources, thereby eliminating administrative costs 
related to investigating fraud. 
 
e) Skilled personnel and a conducive working environment 
 
Similar to the finding in Flynn (2016), this study found that people with the 
requisite skills should be in the employ of the medical scheme. Appropriately 
qualified clinical people should be tasked with granting authorisations for 
hospital admission, so that their knowledge is applied to determine whether the 
admission is medically neccesary. The authorisation personnel should also be 
trained with regard to the benefit policies offered by the medical scheme. 
Personnel tasked with fraud investigation and management should comprise of 
people with various relevant skill sets. This viewpoint is explained in the 
following participants’ quotes: 
 
Uhm proper benefit policies for a start. You must have proper policies of which 
benefits are granted or not. I mean that must be available to the people who 
grant authorisations, work with the authorisations. Ensure that the correct ICD 
codes are captured and then you must also acknowledge all the people doing 
these types of authorisations who have a bit of a medical background to ask 
questions if it appears that there could be a problem you know. Often the 
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member will phone in with a code but it might be beneficial to ask them a bit 
about the condition and so on (3:45). 
 
You need almost a multidisciplinary team and you go put it there and 
investigate. You need people with doctors backgrounds. You need analytical 
people. You need clinical people and you need people with investigation 
background and they must work together. They must combine efforts and 
investigate it (3:22). 
 
But for us at forensics to combat fraud, the employment of top people is, is vital, 
it is crucial, and I will tell you now, just how many of the people have told you 
what, how we are functioning here.  We have got the health investigators, but 
it sounds health investigators but what are the levels of the education (1:11). 
 
The researcher observed, during a walk-through at the medical scheme 
administration company, that the personnel involved in fraud management 
possessed a variety of skills geared towards fraud mitigation.  
 
A conducive working environment was also cited as important, as it will  
encourage staff members to play their part in preventing fraud. 
 
They should be loyal.  I mean if you've got a loyal person, the chances that he 
will defraud you or help to defraud you is low, but if you've got a disgruntled 
employee you will always have problems.  But you can't stop that, because we 
are working with people.  I was in security, we always said in security, the 
system is as good as the people that is running it.  So if your people are loyal 
and they enjoy their work here, you shouldn't have problems (9:55). 
 
f) Segregation of duties 
 
The segregation of duties was highlighted by one of the study participants as a 
valuable control measure in preventing fraud emanating from medical scheme 
employees. This is articulated in the following participant’s quote: 
 
What you can do as well to prevent this is separation of duties (9:56). 
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Different functions should be performed by different employees. Separation of 
duties amongst medical scheme employees could reduce the likelihood that 
internal fraud will remain hidden. 
 
g) Syndicated fraud prevention 
 
Identifying and knowing your client at the application stage could prevent the 
operation of syndicates in medical schemes. 
 
So false policies would also be a big syndicate. So if you know your client at a 
new business stage and you do as much as you can to identify that client then 
everything else around it should be okay (10:11). 
 
So that is a very important aspect and obviously what you would do is the bank 
account provided does belong to the client. You know ask for an ID copy and 
you know even though their ID’s can be. Any measures in place as possible 
and make it just harder for them because what you would also notice is the 
harder you make it for them here to move onto the next scheme (10:12). 
 
This shows that identifying prospective medical scheme members at inception 
could reduce the risk of identity fraud by syndicates. This will also discourage 
this type of fraudster from targeting medical schemes. Fraud corrective control 
measures are discussed in the next section. 
 
4.5.1.4 Fraud corrective control measures 
 
Once a case of fraud has been confirmed, fraud corrective or reactive control 
measures should be implemented. Corrective control measures are 
implemented after the risk event has materialised, in order to remedy the effects 
of the risk (Blunden & Thirlwell, 2013). Fraud corrective measures, which 
include rehabilitation of the provider, termination of the relationship with the 
provider or member, updating of system rules, reporting the service provider to 
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the police and Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA), and 
reversal of fraudulent claims, are discussed in this subsection. 
 
a) Rehabilitate the service provider 
 
If the provider is the first-time offender, the service provider could be 
rehabilitated and given an opportunity to remedy his or her fraudulent 
behaviour. This is explained by the study participants’ quotes:  
 
…always try and do a rehabilitation with the doctor first (12:3). 
 
In certain instances, you actually do want to maintain a relationship with that 
provider for whatever reason, he might be really good in his or her field, or it 
might be a provider that was, like it is the first time they have committed offence 
and you have caught them.  So you want to almost rehabilitate that behavior, 
you want to give them an opportunity to change their ways and you monitor 
them (14:11). 
 
b) Terminate the relationship between the medical scheme and 
member/ service provider 
 
The contract between the fraudulent member or service provider should be 
evaluated to consider if the relationship should be terminated. However, in 
cases of repeat offenders, the relationship should be terminated and the 
provider should be blocked from receiving further authorisation and payment 
for their services from the medical scheme. 
 
Blocking providers from rendering services to our members, and actually 
terminating membership of members who have actively defrauded the system, 
actively and consciously (14:5). 
 
I mean revising the contract whether it be a provider, a member. It would have 
to be a decision regarding whether you want to keep this and then the contract. 
Ja. That would be it. Really important. Especially if you have a member that’s 
sending in false claims (10:7).  
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If it is clear blatant fraud and it has happened a number of times block that 
provider, but sometimes it is just a bit fair to give them an opportunity to change 
their behavior (14:34). 
 
c) Update system rules 
 
The importance of updating the system rules was emphasised. This involves 
updating fraud detection intelligence and reports to incorporate newly 
discovered fraudulent activities.  
 
Fraud reaction measures uhm. Okay so of that system rules, I would also say 
as part of that is update your fraud detection intelligence, your reports that you 
run and those types of things. You must always be flexible to change them as 
you identify new things (3:30). 
 
d) Report the service provider to the police and HPCSA 
 
The service provider found to be commiting fraud should be reported to the 
HPCSA for further investigation, as indicated in the following participants’ 
quotes: 
 
Report to the police, it is fraud, fraud is fraud no matter what, white collar crime 
is a crime (5:26). 
 
Yes, even if the doctor is registered and he does not, according to the members 
he is not, does not look like he is, do the stuff a doctor should do, that is, we 
will report him, or the member can report him to the Health Professionals 
Council to say listen, investigate this doctor, he does not look like he is ethical 
(4:40). 
 
e) Reversal of fraudulent claims 
 
The fraudulent claims should be reversed once fraud is confirmed. However, 
there was a caution against the reversal of claims before the investigation has 
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been finalised. The study participants asserted that this weakens the fraud case 
against the provider. 
 
Reverse the claim, let him pay the money back, why should he benefit (5:25). 
 
And in cases of monies have been unduly paid, we can reverse or we can claim 
that money back (8:33). 
 
Many, our system doesn’t get it necessarily.  So the system don’t catch that 
obviously and it gets reversed daily.  Those claims just in case we miss 
something.  So when we do the cleanups, those reports (13:8). 
 
In my field, cause some of the, if the service is not rendered and it is only a 
member complaint, where services where not rendered to him you, you had a 
word, a chat with the provider and he agrees to, he did not render a service, 
then you can reverse and it goes back to the member’s benefits (4:50). 
 
 We also run reports in the forensic space for duplicate claims so, you know, 
wherever the system picks up a duplicate claim that has been paid out, or as 
forensic investigators we call the provider and we say listen here, you did a 
caesarean section on the 10th and you did a caesarean section on the 11th, 
which day did it happen, and we reverse the claim that is incorrect (7:33). 
 
You know it is, it is not always, you reverse claims sometimes after the, after 
you have met with the provider, if you reverse it before you call the provider for 
the meeting.  He will just say it was, you know, [indistinct] or what you call it, 
stop basically before, you know, if you reverse it, I do not know how to explain 
this, as if the matter is concluded (4:25). 
 
Fraud mitigation control measures reduce the number of opportunities available 
to perpetrators. The control measures make it difficult for fraud to be committed 
against the medical scheme, and ultimately deter the fraudster. If the risk of 
being caught is high and the consequences are substantial, fraudsters are 
discouraged from continuing with the behaviour. Therefore, a policy to guide 
fraud mitigation activities should be put in place. Fraud preventative, detective 
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and corrective controls should be implemented in order to mitigate fraud in 
medical scheme claims. These measures are depicted in figure 4.3 below. 
 
Figure 4.3  Internal control measures 
Source: Author 
 
The next section examines the reporting of fraud as a means to assist in 
mitigating medical scheme fraud. 
 
4.5.2 Reporting of fraud 
 
Most of the study participants agreed that reporting fraud in the annual report 
would assist in the mitigation of medical scheme fraud. Feedback should be 
given to whistle-blowers, irrespective of the result of the investigation. Reporting 
fraud in the annual report will increase fraud awareness and justify the medical 
scheme’s investment in fraud management-related activities. Moreover, public 
confidence will be gained, as the scheme will demonstrate that fraud is 
Internal 
control 
measures
Directive 
control
Fraud 
detective 
controls
Corrective 
controls
Preventative 
controls
97 
 
investigated and managed by the medical scheme. The value of the reporting 
of fraud is represented in the thematic map in Figure 4.4 below. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Reporting of fraud  
Source: Author 
 
4.5.2.1 Increase fraud awareness and justify investment in fraud 
management activities 
 
The benefits that were anticipated from reporting fraud in the annual report 
included the opportunity to highlight medical scheme fraud and increase 
awareness amongst all stakeholders. Furthermore, awareness of the level and 
magnitude of fraud will be enhanced thereby justifying the investment in fraud-
mitigating activities. This is expressed in the following participants’ quotes: 
 
You know I think forensics must not be closed, it must be open for the whole of 
xxxx to see, you know, every department, and with doing that, if people are 
aware of fraud they, like I said earlier, they actually check for fraud in each and 
every section of their work (7:25). 
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…it will create awareness and that in itself will go somewhere to mitigate fraud 
(3:31). 
Create awareness in the company and then hopefully filter down to the areas 
where it should. So obviously it will have an effect (10:17). 
 
…because if you’re reporting on continue, investing on mitigating on fraud 
(15:9). 
 
I think what would be good is the publication of certain instances.  To say, let’s 
say for example, we catch a surgeon who has been doing breast augmentation 
and billing for lumpectomy’s, for that to be published in some form of medical 
journal. So that doctors who read it, they see that we are thinking out the box, 
when we look at, when we come from a forensic approach (8:29).   
 
You know in the end of the day with the annual report there is also a savings 
for the company, are we doing our work, why do you have a unit, a forensic unit 
to investigate if there is no fraud, you got, need them, there is fraud, they need 
to investigate it (5:19). 
 
4.5.2.2 Increase public confidence 
 
The suggestion was made that the whistle-blowers, whether internal or 
external, should be given feedback on the cases that were reported. Reporting 
on how fraud is managed by the scheme will increase public confidence in the 
medical scheme. The following quotes express the participants’ views: 
 
Ja, but also in the company, let the people know that the fraudsters are being 
caught you know, and the preventions that was placed helped to catch the 
criminals.  …You know it just builds confidence as well that people know, okay 
whoa, our people are working and we can catch, you know.  We on any case 
of ours we will report back to the person the outcome of the investigation... it's 
good to give feedback to the people that (9:26). 
 
I think, yes, because as we report on fraud, I mean, it is a pattern that every 
year, there is more money being recovered to the scheme from fraud.  Uhm, 
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as we report on that, it is a pattern that will constantly be going upwards, in 
which case, the people who have access to that and see it are going to see 
that we are getting better and we are picking up more things. And it might, it 
will hopefully make them think twice when submitting fraudulent claims or 
committing fraud or anything similar, they will think twice (8:24).   
 
Young (2015) emphasised the importance of reporting in the effective 
management of risks. This sentiment appeared to be shared by the study 
participants. The reporting of fraud in the annual report by medical schemes will 
facilitate communication to the public, thereby creating fraud awareness. It will 
also provide an opportunity for the medical scheme to instil confidence in the 
public that fraud is being managed. Furthermore, it will demonstrate that the 
amount of funds spent on fraud mitigation strategies is warranted.  
 
The following section focuses on the role that the collaborative efforts between 
various stakeholders could play in effectively mitigating fraud in medical 
schemes. 
 
4.5.3 Stakeholder collaboration 
 
4.5.3.1 Medical scheme industry collaboration 
 
Medical schemes should work together to mitigate fraud through information 
and data sharing. These collaborative efforts should also extend to collective 
investment in fraud management activities. 
 
a) Information and data sharing 
 
Regular conferences should be organised for the sharing of information on the 
types of frauds and trends experienced by various medical schemes, as well as 
control measures to mitigate this risk. The details of fraudulent service providers 
and medical scheme members should also be shared amongst medical 
schemes, in order to alert other schemes to the fraudsters. In addition, fraud 
investigation efforts should be combined across different medical schemes to 
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successfully prosecute perpetrators. This was indicated by the participants in 
the following quotes: 
 
We already, you know, work together with certain schemes.  When we identify 
a provider we meet with them, we share info.  If he is doing it to one scheme 
he is also doing it to other schemes (4:27). 
 
I think they can have annual conferences to discuss areas and scenarios of 
fraud which will make, you know, the various parties look at fraud maybe a little 
bit differently; or go and review their data differently (6:17). 
 
So it would be good to share that information to other schemes, so almost to, I 
know you are like really penalizing the member, but to just like an FYI this 
member has been terminated for doing such and such, so it makes it very 
difficult for a member to join another scheme, again it would be a deterrent 
(14:8). 
 
That’s a tender point in our country. I mean you know how it goes. People don’t 
want to. I think sharing of information is very important. So they need to share 
the details of fraudulent providers. They need to share the details of fraudulent 
trends that they pick up and sometimes I think it’s important that different 
medical aid schemes combine investigations in order to successfully prosecute 
the provider. You can say there it’s almost always important to get a global 
picture and you can only get a global picture if there is data and information 
sharing from all stakeholders (3:17). 
 
Data should be shared among all medical schemes in South Africa to unpack 
and assess claiming patterns, in order to identify fraud and prosecute the 
perpetrators at industry level. This will also prevent medical scheme members 
from requesting the same procedure across various medical schemes - for 
example, the amputation of the left leg paid by one scheme being requested 
again by the same member from another medical scheme. 
 
I mean, it is going to build a solid strong case, and once again, that is by sharing 
information and, it is like for example, in the police force we used to work on 
crime and intelligence here, then we will find all of a sudden that murder and 
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robbery is working on the same thing but it is, we have got the same suspect, 
but we are not sharing information because you, we do not want you to must 
know what I know, and a lot of times then the guy gets away with that because, 
you know, he is investigating this part of the crime, and we investigated this 
part of it, but yet they are actually together, they are running in parallel, and you 
do not know that because you are too scared to share information (5:16). 
 
b) Joint investment in fraud management activities  
 
A biometric identification system at the point of receiving healthcare treatment 
should be established to curb card farming. The cost of implementing the 
system should be shared amongst all the medical schemes.  
 
I think medical aids should join together for that [biometric identification 
system]. Like it should be a joint effort.  Because then it defeats the purpose if 
one medical scheme is going to do it, it costs them everything and also they, 
how to better the industry. Because fraud affects all of them (2:11). 
 
4.5.3.2 Collaboration between medical schemes and health insurance 
companies 
 
Short-term insurers should inform medical schemes about members in 
possession of a hospital cash plan, so that these members’ claiming patterns 
can be closely monitored. Furthermore, fraud trends should be shared between 
insurers and medical schemes. This is explained by the participants’ quotes: 
 
Also sharing data and sharing trends picked up (6:18). 
 
In my opinion it’s important that they share databases. It’s important that the 
medical aids know which of their members do have cash plans and then it’s 
important that they share any uhm on toward behaviour or high-risk claims or 
whatever you want to call it. Especially from the cash plan side. They should 
share [unclear] on their policies with the medical aid schemes so that we can 
investigate on our side (3:19). 
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We have even done together investigations with the investigators out in the 
field, and we collaborated with them, and then stopped the guys thing, and the 
man is crying now because he does not want to go to jail, he knows jail is not 
a pleasant place for people like that (5:9). 
 
There is an indication that medical schemes working together with short-term 
insurers to mitigate fraud in claims will yield a better result. This includes 
combining resources to fund the strategies to fight fraud. The medical scheme 
administration company attends multi-insurers’ forums, which encompass 
medical schemes and insurers that offer healthcare insurance products, such 
as hospital cash plans, meeting to discuss matters relating to fraud. 
 
4.5.3.3 Medical scheme collaboration with the Department of Health and 
Department of Justice 
 
Most of the study participants opined that medical schemes working together 
with relevant stakeholders, including the Department of Health and the 
Department of Justice, will assist in the fight against fraud, as indicated in the 
following quotes from participants:  
 
If the public sector and the private sector had to join hands oh my God!  Can 
you imagine how fraud can be eradicated (1:12)? 
 
I think my answer to that would be in the end I think it is important that there’s 
collaboration between all the parties because each must bring their bit in order 
to get the industry clean, the whole medical industry. So there is a place for the 
justice department. In certain cases, people need to be prosecuted. The Health 
Department also have a role to play. Ja. I think that’s my answer. Collaboration 
is important and each party needs to bring their bit in order to get the whole 
industry (3:21). 
 
It is awareness; it speaks to the seriousness of problem areas.  So, like the 
hospital cash plan for example, we work closely with the cash plan, but if you 
made this known nationally to every authority involved in health care it just puts 
more pressure on everyone not to do this, because now the Department of 
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Health is going to be scrutinizing it at some level, the Health Professional 
Councils are going to be aware that it is going on, they are probably going to 
have a register of providers to commit fraud, at least start feeling bad for people 
that want to commit it (14:19). 
 
The study also found that to mitigate medical scheme fraud, the training of 
specific police members and prosecutors, who will be tasked to investigate and 
prosecute healthcare fraud would assist in successful management of this 
crime. Furthermore, the study revealed that tertiary institutions should include 
training on discipline-specific-coding in their curricula. The aforementioned 
measures are explained in the ensuing subsection. 
 
a) Training of police and prosecutors on healthcare fraud  
 
There were concerns raised with regard to the ability of police and prosecutors 
to investigate and prosecute medical scheme fraud. The recommendation was 
made that special police units and a few prosecutors should be trained on 
healthcare fraud by medical schemes. This will equip the Department of Justice 
with the skills required to successfully prosecute fraudsters. This was indicated 
by the following participants:  
 
So trust issue with the police and trust issue with the justice department, for me 
personally, is an issue. I have had a court case now in Wynberg Court where 
the prosecutor did not even know how to prosecute fraud (1:13). 
 
The police ability to deal with medical aid fraud is sometimes questionable in 
my opinion (3:14) … your chance of successful prosecution after spending days 
and weeks in court is minimal (3:15).  
 
The only thing is, the police don’t have the infrastructure or the resources to 
investigate it, so effectively, which is why so many departments like fraud, like 
ours have been erected in different companies (8:22). 
 
Ja, it's for my company's knowledge to investigate my cases and get it 
successful so that we can get the wrongdoers off the street.  But other people 
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say no it is my personal police, and I am misusing them, so the best idea then 
is actually that the whole medical aid fraternity make that suggestion and say 
listen, let's go to the police and say listen, let's train people in that area like 
Bloemfontein or major areas, on how to work with our cases.  And then with 
one or two Prosecutors in the area.  We will get much better (9:40). 
 
b) Coding training at tertiary institutions 
 
In order to decrease coding irregularities, the training of healthcare service 
providers should be enhanced to include training on the utilisation of a 
discipline-specific billing manual. 
 
Ja, providers need to be trained on what the codes are and how they need to 
use them (8:31) … so, training in tertiary institutions (8:32). 
 
Combined efforts amongst different stakeholders will go a long way in mitigating 
fraud in medical schemes. Medical schemes should work together by sharing 
the details of fraudulent providers and members to root out fraud at industry 
level. Fraud trends and management strategies shared between medical 
schemes would mitigate fraudulent claims in medical schemes. Looking beyond 
the medical industry, the medical industry collaborating with short-term 
insurance companies and the Department of Health could yield positive results 
as certain fraud affects both entities. Flynn (2016) also recommended that the 
public and private healthcare sectors should collaborate to effectively manage 
fraud in the healthcare industry. The Department of Justice would also assist in 
prosecuting fraudsters to deter this risk.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The chapter presented the analysis and findings of the study on the types of 
fraud experienced in South African medical schemes. The manner in which this 
fraud could be mitigated was also presented. The findings were supported by 
descriptions and direct quotes from study participants’ interview transcripts. In 
105 
 
the next chapter, the conclusion and recommendations of the study are 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter presented the findings from the data analysis in this study.  
In this chapter, the research conclusion derived from the findings of the study 
is discussed. Furthermore, recommendations on strategies to mitigate fraud in 
South African medical scheme claims are detailed. Lastly, the limitations of the 
study and suggested areas for future research are discussed. 
 
The main objective of the study, as indicated in section 1.5 in chapter one, was 
to identify strategies to mitigate fraud in South African medical scheme claims. 
The secondary objectives were, firstly, to identify the types of fraud perpetrated 
against South African medical schemes, and secondly, to explore strategies to 
mitigate this type of fraud. In the next subsection, the conclusion of the study is 
presented. 
 
5.2 Conclusion of the study 
 
The conclusion of the study were drawn in terms of the objectives of the study. 
 
5.2.1 Identification of the types of fraudulent activities perpetrated 
against South African medical schemes 
 
This study concluded that perpetrators defraud South African medical schemes 
in numerous ways. These perpetrators encompass service providers, medical 
scheme members, medical scheme employees, brokers and syndicates. 
Medical scheme fraud also occurs by means of collusion between medical 
scheme members and service providers, or between service providers.  Most 
of the fraudulent activities were committed by healthcare service providers, who 
submitted false claims to medical schemes. This was done by providing 
distorted information that indicated that the covered services were rendered. 
Moreover, irregular billing of codes, which involves up-coding, code padding 
and unbundling of codes, was another method used by service providers to 
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defraud medical schemes. Service providers also billed excessively for services 
or products, and provided services that were medically unnecessary. There 
were instances where the service providers billed the scheme for a covered 
benefit or product, but provided services or products that are excluded by the 
medical scheme. Duplicate claims were also submitted by service providers. 
Furthermore, unlicensed service providers billed medical schemes for services 
provided to members. 
 
Members of medical schemes committed fraud by either failing to disclose a 
pre-existing medical condition, or through card farming (sharing medical 
scheme benefits with non-members). Employee fraud encompassed changing 
banking details of members to channel funds for a member’s claim to their own 
banking account. Medical scheme employees submitted false claims to their 
own medical scheme. Brokers mainly committed fraud by submitting false 
policy applications, and by failing to disclose the applicant’s pre-existing 
medical condition.  
 
Collusion to defraud medical schemes occurs amongst medical scheme 
members and service providers, or amongst service providers. Medical scheme 
members and service providers collude to claim for excluded benefits or non-
medical items as covered benefits and to access cash plan benefits from short-
term insurers. Another form of collusion occurs amongst hospitals and 
independent allied service providers (for example, nurses, physiotherapists, 
and dieticians). This type of collusion involves the hospital giving allied 
healthcare providers access to the medical scheme details of the patient 
admitted to the hospital, in order to claim for services not rendered.  In most 
instances, these services, such as nursing, are provided by hospital employees, 
and are charged as part of the hospital bill that is submitted to the medical 
scheme. 
 
Syndicates that defraud medical schemes may include medical scheme 
members, employees of the medical scheme, service providers, brokers or any 
other person. Firstly, through identity theft, the syndicate applies for a medical 
scheme policy for unsuspecting members. Thereafter, the syndicate submits 
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false claims to medical schemes. Secondly, syndicates that defraud medical 
schemes can include only service providers, especially where service providers 
of the same family refer the same medical scheme members to each other. 
Thirdly, a syndicate that includes medical scheme members usually targets 
service providers for cash. At times, syndicates target specific medical 
schemes. The study also established that syndicates sometimes aim to build a 
health profile with the medical scheme, with the intention to defraud other 
products, for instance life policies and cash plans offered by long-term and 
short-term insurers. Table 5.1 below presents a summary of the types of fraud 
perpetrated against South African medical schemes. 
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Table 5.1: Fraudulent activities committed against medical schemes in South Africa 
Service provider 
fraud 
Medical scheme 
member fraud 
Employee fraud Broker fraud Collusion Syndicated fraud 
 False claims 
 Irregular billing of 
codes 
 Excessive billing 
for services and 
products 
 Provision of 
unnecessary 
medical services 
 Duplicate claims 
 Excluded products 
and benefits 
claimed as 
covered benefits 
 Unlicensed service 
providers 
 
 Non-disclosure of 
pre-existing 
medical condition 
 Card farming 
 
 False claims 
 Channeling a 
member’s refunds 
for claims to own 
account 
 False medical 
scheme policies 
 Non-disclosure of 
the applicant’s 
pre-existing 
medical condition 
 Excluded benefits 
or non-medical 
items claimed as 
covered benefits 
 Cash plan- related 
fraud 
 Hospital colluding 
with independent 
allied service 
providers 
 Identity theft to 
submit false claims 
 Family syndicate 
involving referral of 
same members 
between service 
providers of the 
same family 
 Syndicates build a 
health profile to 
defraud other 
products, e.g. life 
policy, hospital 
cash pan  
Source: Author 
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The various types of fraudulent activities presented in this section demonstrate 
that medical schemes are defrauded utilising different methods. Most of the 
fraud categories were found to be committed by service providers. In addition, 
syndicates, members of medical schemes, employees of the medical scheme 
and brokers have found ways to defraud medical schemes. This type of fraud 
is also committed through collusion amongst service providers, or between 
medical scheme members and service providers. 
 
The following section presents the strategies that can be used to mitigate fraud 
in medical scheme claims. 
 
5.2.2  Examination of strategies to mitigate fraud in South African 
medical scheme claims  
 
Strategies to mitigate fraudulent claims are presented in this section. The study 
established that fraud in medical scheme claims could be mitigated in several 
ways. These strategies have been categorised into internal controls that the 
medical scheme could implement, reporting on fraud, and stakeholder 
collaboration.  
 
Internal control measures include, firstly, implementing a fraud policy to direct 
fraud-mitigating activities in medical schemes. Secondly, fraud detection 
measures should be put in place. Syndicate fraud detection requires special 
investigations utilising various intelligence, as it is complex to identify. Thirdly, 
known fraud could be mitigated by implementing preventative control 
measures. Furthermore, corrective control measures, which could be executed 
once fraud has been identified and confirmed, were found to be essential in 
managing fraud.  
 
Moreover, reporting on fraud in the medical scheme’s annual report was 
regarded as a way to increase fraud awareness amongst stakeholders.  
Reporting on fraud further justifies the amount of funds allocated to fraud 
mitigation activities. Providing feedback regarding the outcome of the reported 
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fraud cases by the public or internal employees for further investigation will 
increase public confidence in the medical scheme. 
 
Collaborative efforts amongst medical schemes will contribute towards 
combatting fraud in claims. Furthermore, if the medical scheme industry 
combines forces with short-term insurers who offer cash plans, this could curb 
the type of fraud that is directed at both industries. The Department of Health 
and the Department of Justice were cited in the study as important stakeholders 
in mitigating fraud in medical scheme claims. The next section recommends 
strategies to mitigate fraud in South African medical scheme claims. 
 
5.3 Recommendations 
 
Recommended medical scheme fraud mitigation strategies are discussed in 
this section. Firstly, a fraud policy should be implemented, maintained, 
communicated and enforced, in order to guide fraud management activities in 
medical schemes. Continuous monitoring of fraud in claims should be 
employed to detect fraud. Fraud detection measures should be put in place, 
which include whistle-blowing, fraud detection systems, audits and 
investigations. Syndicate fraud is detected through the investigation of 
systematic linkages by using various criteria.  
 
Fraud can be prevented by raising fraud awareness among service providers 
and medical scheme members, member verification at points of service, 
implementation of proper benefit limits, segregation of duties, and automated 
system rejections. Furthermore, employing personnel with requisite skills in 
medical schemes was found to assist in mitigating fraud. The creation of a 
conducive working environment by the medical scheme management will assist 
in increasing loyalty amongst staff, which will in turn enhance employees’ 
involvement in fraud-mitigating strategies. 
 
Furthermore, corrective control measures should be adopted, which 
encompass the rehabilitation of the service provider for first-time offenders, and 
the termination of the relationship with fraudulent medical scheme members or 
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service providers, particularly for repeat offenders. Fraud trends evolve over 
time, hence the system rules must be updated in instances where a new type 
of fraud is detected. The fraudulent service provider must be reported to the 
police for prosecution. In addition, the service provider must be reported to the 
Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) for further investigation. 
Fraudulent claims must be reversed once the forensic investigation has been 
completed. 
 
Moreover, reporting on fraud was regarded as a way to mitigate this risk. In this 
regard, reporting fraud in the annual report of the organisation will increase 
fraud awareness amongst stakeholders and justify the amount of funds 
allocated to fraud mitigation activities.  Furthermore, feedback regarding the 
outcome of the reported fraud cases by the public or internal employees will 
increase public confidence in the medical scheme. 
 
Collaborative efforts amongst medical schemes aimed at sharing fraud trends 
and information on fraudulent providers and medical scheme members will also 
assist in mitigating this risk. Medical schemes should share data to assess fraud 
at the industry level. Combined efforts amongst all South African medical 
schemes, by collectively providing funds for fraud-mitigating activities, were 
also suggested in the study. Medical schemes should collaborate with short-
term insurers who offer cash plans, in order to manage interrelated fraud 
perpetrated in both industries.  
 
The Department of Health and the Department of Justice were cited in the study 
as important stakeholders in mitigating fraud in medical scheme claims. Coding 
training for healthcare professionals should be included in tertiary curricula to 
minimise the irregular billing of codes. Lastly, the special police unit and a few 
prosecutors should be trained by medical schemes on healthcare fraud, in order 
to increase the success rate of prosecution by the Department of Justice. The 
successful prosecution of fraud in medical scheme claims will ultimately reduce 
this risk. Table 5.2 below presents the recommended matrix for mitigating fraud 
in South African medical schemes.  
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Table 5.2: Mitigation matrix for fraud in South African medical scheme claims 
INTERNAL CONTROL MEASURES 
Directive control Detective controls 
Preventative 
controls Corrective controls 
Fraud policy  Incentivised 
whistle-blowing 
 Fraud detection 
system 
 Audits 
 Investigations 
 
 
 
 
 Fraud awareness 
among medical 
scheme members 
and service 
providers 
 Member 
verification at the 
point of service 
 Proper benefit 
limits 
 Automated 
system rejections 
 Skilled personnel 
and conducive 
working 
environment 
 Segregation of 
duties 
 Knowledge of 
clients at the 
application stage 
 Rehabilitate the 
healthcare service 
provider 
 Terminate the 
relationship with 
the service 
provider 
 Terminate the 
relationship with 
medical scheme 
members 
 Update system 
rules 
 Report the service 
provider to the 
police and HPCSA 
 Reverse fraudulent 
claims once the 
investigation is 
completed 
Reporting on fraud 
Collaboration amongst medical schemes 
Collaboration between medical schemes and short-term insurers 
Collaboration between medical schemes, Department of Health and Department of Justice 
Source: Author 
 
The next section discusses the anticipated contribution of this study. 
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5.4 Contribution of the study 
 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge pertaining to the mitigation of 
fraud in South African medical scheme claims. The recommendations made by 
the study could be implemented by South African medical schemes to mitigate 
fraud in claims more effectively, thereby reducing the amount expended on 
fraudulent claims and supporting cost containment strategies. The effective 
control of this risk could improve the financial viability and reserves of medical 
schemes.  
 
The savings and recoveries emanating from fraudulent claims could also be 
directed towards the enrichment of benefit offerings and improvement of service 
delivery to medical scheme members. Furthermore, medical scheme members 
would benefit from a reduced rate of increment on monthly contributions, 
thereby enhancing their affordability. The medical scheme industry will also 
grow, as more people will be able to pay the monthly contributions. The 
following section discusses the limitations of the study. 
 
5.5 Limitations of the study 
 
Polonsky and Waller (2011) emphasised that no matter how cautious the 
researcher is, there are always some issues that limit or affect the adoption of 
the results. Therefore, they viewed limitations as playing an important role in 
contextualising the research findings. The first limitation of this study relates to 
the methodology that was employed. An exploratory qualitative approach was 
followed and one medical scheme administrator was selected in order to collect 
data. Therefore, the results cannot be generalised to all medical schemes in 
South Africa.  
 
Furthermore, the results cannot be applied to the South African healthcare 
system as a whole, as only medical scheme fraud was studied, which excluded 
the public healthcare sector. Another limitation of the study was the participants’ 
bias, as the opinions and insights of the research participants were sought, 
which formed the basis of the research findings. Nonetheless, the 
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recommendations from the study are valuable in helping medical schemes to 
understand the types of fraudulent activities that are committed in claims, as 
well as strategies to manage the risk in order to reduce fruitless expenditure. 
Recommended areas for further research are advanced in the next section. 
 
5.6 Areas for further research 
 
In this study, the aim was to gain rich insights into fraud experiences in medical 
schemes and the strategies to mitigate this type of risk, using a qualitative 
methodology. Future research could employ a different research methodolody, 
which may yield different results on the management of fraud in medical 
scheme claims.  The study utilised a case study strategy. Therefore, the study 
could be replicated in future utilising a strategy that will permit the 
generalisability of the results to all medical scheme administators in South 
Africa.   
 
This study was delimited to medical schemes in the South African context. 
However, medical schemes form part of the South African healthcare financing 
system. Therefore, a study focusing on fraud in the public healthcare sector in 
South Africa is recommended for further research. A study investigating the 
implementation of a legal framework to combat fraud in the South African 
healthcare system is also proposed. Lastly, studies focusing on employee and 
broker fraud in healthcare are suggested for future research. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
In this study, fraud mitigation strategies in South African medical scheme claims 
were examined. An exploratory qualitative methodology was followed, utilising 
a case study strategy. One medical scheme administrator was chosen as a 
case, from which a purposive sample was selected. Data was collected, which 
provided insights and opinions regarding the fraudulent activities perpetrated 
against medical schemes, through individual semi structured interviews. 
Furthermore, strategies to mitigate fraud in medical scheme claims were 
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examined. Thematic data analysis was employed with the aid of ATLAS.ti 
software.  
 
The case study found that South African medical schemes were defrauded in 
various ways, mostly by service providers through the submission of false 
claims and irregular billing of codes. Medical scheme members, brokers, 
medical scheme employees and syndicates also defrauded medical schemes. 
Fraud mitigation strategies in South African medical claims were presented in 
the recommendations matrix, which commenced with directive control in the 
form of fraud policy. Various fraud detective, preventative and corrective control 
measures were advanced in this study. The importance of reporting on fraud 
was also highlighted. If medical schemes work together and with other 
stakeholders, this will assist in effectively mitigating fraud in medical scheme 
claims. 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
1. In your experience, give me examples of fraud activities that are 
committed against medical schemes?  
2. In your opinion, how could sharing of membership cards and benefits by 
the members of medical schemes with non-scheme members be 
prevented? 
3. Which measures should be put in place to prevent granting 
authorisations and payment of claims for invalid members? 
4. In your opinion, which mechanisms could assist in the prevention of 
authorisation for services and payment for claims submitted by 
unlicensed service providers (e.g. unlicensed hospitals, unregistered 
doctors)? 
5. In your opinion, how could the authorisation of excluded benefits be 
prevented?  
6. In your opinion, how could payment of non-medical items (for example; 
sunglasses, toiletries, money/ ATMs) be prevented? 
7. How can payment for duplicate claims be mitigated? 
8. In your opinion, which controls/ measures should be put in place to 
proactively or reactively manage irregular billing of codes, for example; 
unbundling of codes, code padding (billing for extra codes) and up 
coding? 
9. Which controls should be put in place to mitigate fraud in out of hospital 
claims, which do not require prior authorisation, submitted by for 
example, physiotherapists, pharmacies and general practitioners? 
10. In your opinion, how could collusion amongst members and services 
providers to defraud medical schemes be prevented? 
11. In your opinion, which measures/ controls should be implemented to 
identify syndicates aiming to defraud medical schemes? 
12. In your opinion, will reporting on fraud on the annual report assist in 
mitigating fraud? 
13. How can the South African medical schemes work together to mitigate 
fraud risk in claims? 
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14. In your opinion, how can the medical schemes work together with 
insurance companies to manage false claims related to hospital cash 
plan benefits? 
15. Do you think medical scheme industry collaborating with the Department 
of Health, The Justice Department and Council for Medical Schemes 
could assist in management of fraud in medical schemes? If so, please 
elaborate. 
16. In your opinion, how can the medical schemes mitigate fraud risk in 
claims that have not been addressed in the above questions? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
APPENDIX B: ETHICAL CLEARANCE 
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APPENDIX C:  CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY 
 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY: 
MITIGATING FRAUD RISK IN SOUTH AFRICAN MEDICAL SCHEMES 
 
 
I, _____________________________________________________, confirm that the 
person asking my consent to take part in this research has told me about the nature, 
procedure, potential benefits and anticipated inconvenience of participation.  
 
I have read or had explained to me and understood the study as explained in the 
information sheet.  I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and am prepared 
to participate in the study. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am 
free to withdraw at any time without penalty. I am aware that the findings of this study 
will be anonymously processed into a research report, journal publications and/or 
conference proceedings.   
 
I agree to the audio recording of the interview as well as notes taken by the interviewer.  
 
I have received a signed copy of the informed consent agreement. 
 
Full Name of Participant: _______________________________________________ 
 
Signature of Participant: ___________________________ Date: _______________ 
 
Full Name of Researcher: ______________________________________________ 
 
Signature of Researcher: ___________________________ Date: _______________ 
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APPENDIX D:  TRANSCRIPTION CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT 
 
